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ABSTRACT 
 
Applications of Engineering and Financial Analysis to the Valuation of Investments in 
Railroad Infrastructure. (May 2009) 
Craig Emmitt Roco, B.S., Stephen F. Austin State University, B.S.; M.S.; M.S., 
Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Ivan Damnjanovic 
 
This record of study presents the findings of industry research projects performed during 
a one-year doctoral internship with the Austin Rail Group of HNTB Corporation.  Four 
main internship objectives were established that address infrastructure problems related 
to the railroad industry and required the integration of engineering and financial analysis 
to develop effective project evaluation tools.  Completion of the objectives resulted in: 
 
• Transformation of the Federal Railroad Administration methodology 
currently used to perform highway-railroad grade crossing analyses to a 
system of equations that can easily be used to evaluate regional rail 
infrastructure investments. Transportation engineering equations based on 
queuing theory were extended to new but equivalent formulations that 
accommodate unlimited, discrete train performance data from computer 
simulations of rail networks.   
• Application of risk assessment methods and railroad accident statistics to 
recommend a cost-effective alternative to legislative proposals to relocate 
hazardous materials transported by rail around metropolitan areas.  A risk 
analysis model was developed to predict the risk of exposure from the release 
of a hazardous material following a train derailment so that changes in 
exposure achieved by alternative risk mitigation strategies could be observed. 
 iv
• A new method of measuring the susceptibility of railroads to financial 
distress following the catastrophic loss of a timber railroad bridge.  Economic 
and finance principles were used to predict financial distress by determining 
of the number of revenue periods required to offset economic loss.   
• Demonstration of the use of financial market data in calculating the discount 
rate of public railroad companies for engineering analyses that involve 
negotiations with the public agencies.  Surface Transportation Board rulings 
on the determination of a railroad’s cost of equity were applied to a 
comparative assessment of costs of capital for Class I railroads.  A 
hypothetical example was used to demonstrate the interrelationship between 
engineering design strategies and their effects on the pricing of compensation 
to a railroad for right-of-way acquisition.        
 
These results, in fulfillment of the doctoral internship objectives, have provided HNTB 
with economic decision analysis tools and a series of conclusions used to provide 
recommendations to the Illinois, Missouri, and Texas Departments of Transportation, the 
Texas Legislature, and the railroad industry.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The practice of engineering in industry differs from that of performing engineering 
research in academia by the extent to which professional duties involve the resolution of 
non-technical issues.  Engineering practice frequently involves economic evaluations or 
policy formulation and analysis, requiring new methods of applying information from 
diverse disciplines in ways that are not considered fundamental research.  As a result, the 
Doctor of Engineering degree is structured to emphasize the integration of engineering 
principles with issues deemed important to industry and society, demonstrated primarily 
through performance during a one-year internship with a private firm or public agency. 
 
This record of study documents the application of both engineering and business 
principles during a one-year internship with the engineering and architecture firm of 
HNTB Corporation, headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri.  Consulting services were 
provided to public and private sector clients during the internship as a member of the 
Texas Rail Group, located in HNTB’s Austin, Texas office.  Considering that a number 
of services provided by the Rail Group focus on resolving conflicts between the market-
driven needs of railroad companies and the societal objectives of public agencies, 
fulfillment of the internship objectives presented in this chapter rely to great extent on 
the integration of engineering principles with those of finance and economics. 
 
This chapter first provides a history of HNTB Corporation that examines how events in 
the United States and abroad transformed the firm as it strived to find opportunity in an 
ever-changing world.  The corporate structure of HNTB is then presented as a reference  
 
___________  
This record of study follows the style of Transportation Research Record. 
2 
to the Rail Group’s placement within the overall context of the firm, emphasizing the 
various levels of oversight and control that guides management in decision-making 
processes.  Then, internship objectives are outlined, which represent specific identifiable 
industry needs that are addressed through the application of knowledge acquired during 
the Doctor of Engineering academic program.  The organization of this record of study is 
provided at the end of this chapter as orientation to the sequencing of approaches and 
solutions presented to demonstrate fulfillment of each objective.              
 
1.1 HNTB Corporate History 
The foundation for what eventually would become the engineering and architectural firm 
known as HNTB Corporation was laid by Dr. John Alexander Low Waddell, an 1875 
graduate from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and renowned bridge engineer, and to 
whom a Doctor of Engineering degree is included among his academic achievements.  
By 1886, Dr. Waddell had established an engineering practice in Kansas City, Missouri 
after several years of academic service and employment with railroad companies.  The 
Waddell “A” Truss, originally constructed as a single track bridge for the Kansas City 
Southern Railway (Figure 1.1), was patented in 1894.1  
         
            
                         Figure 1.1  Configuration of Waddell “A” Truss Bridge. 
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Dr. Waddell partnered with Ira G. Hedrick from 1899 to 1906, followed by a partnership 
begun in 1907 with John L. Harrington, an academically devoted engineer with B.S., 
A.M., and C.E. degrees from the University of Kansas and both B.S. and M.S. degrees 
from McGill University.  The firm of Waddell & Harrington designed landmark bridges 
during its seven years of existence, including the Detroit-Superior Bridge over the 
Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio (Figure 1.2) and the Colorado Street Bridge over the 
Arroyo-Seco in Pasadena, California (Figure 1.3).2 
 
     
     Figure 1.2  Detroit-Superior Bridge over Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio. 
 
 
 
            
      Figure 1.3  Colorado Street Bridge over Arroyo-Seco in Pasadena, California. 
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Waddell’s best known work materialized through his design of the South Halsted Street 
Bridge in 1892, years prior to his partnership with either Hedrick or Harrington.  The 
South Halsted Street Bridge over the South Chicago River in Chicago, Illinois consisted 
of a single Pratt-truss span 130 feet in length with a vertical lift height of 155 feet, 
making it the first large-scale, high-clearance lift span of its type in the United States.  
The firm of Waddell & Harrington designed more that two dozen vertical lift bridges 
between 1907 and 1914 before dissolving the partnership over differences concerning 
how to improve the design of Waddell’s original lift mechanism.  Waddell went on to 
found Waddell & Hardesty in 1927 with Shortridge Hardesty, the precursor to the firm 
known today as Hardesty & Hanover. 
 
Harrington provided continuity in the firm’s engineering practice through the promotion 
of Ernest E. Howard and Louis R. Ash, both of whom began with the firm (i.e., Waddell 
& Hedrick) in 1901.  Harrington, Howard & Ash thrived as a bridge design firm under 
the new partnership, particularly in the expanding market for vertical lift bridges.  
Between 1914 and 1928, the firm is estimated to have completed at least 45 vertical lift 
bridges, 13 bascule bridges, and six rolling bascules bridges for railroad clients both in 
the United States and abroad. 
 
The firm broadened its client base during the years of Harrington, Howard & Ash by 
designing privately-financed highway toll bridges in the northeast.  In order to forge 
strong relationships with the bankers who financed these private facilities, Harrington 
sent Enoch R. Needles to establish a new office in the financial district of New York 
City in 1922.  Shortly after joining the firm in 1917, Needles’ ability to gain the trust and 
friendship of business associates led to field assignments all across the country, and 
ultimately resulted in the development of important contacts upon his arrival in New 
York City. 
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The early 1920s was a time of firm-wide success and recognition.  Howard received the 
distinguished Fitch Rowland Prize for his publications on vertical lift bridges, 
Harrington was serving as President of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 
and the entire firm was busy designing bridges located as far away as Russia and in 
response to the booming real estate market occurring in Florida.  The late 1920s, 
however, was met with significant challenges.  Differences in temperament between 
Harrington and his partners resulted in the dissolution of the partnership in 1928, 
prompting Ash and Howard to reorganize as Ash, Howard, Needles & Tammen in 
deference to the contributions of Needles and Henry C. Tammen, a gifted engineer who 
joined the firm (i.e., Waddell & Harrington) in 1908.2 
 
Tragedy struck both the firm and the country as the 1920s drew to an end.  The stock 
market crash and start of the Great Depression in 1929 began just as Ash, Howard, 
Needles & Tammen had turned a year old.  The firm experienced the tragic loss of Ash 
due to illness the following year, most likely attributable to his earlier decent into pier 
caissons during a personal inspection of the Vicksburg Bridge being constructed over the 
Mississippi River.  Several of the firm’s other bridges were also entering the 
construction phase in 1929, such as the Burlington-Bristol Bridge over the Delaware 
River with its record-breaking 540-ft vertical lift span (Figure 1.4).  Even though, the 
prevailing financial panic drastically curtailed prospects for new design work.     
 
        
       Figure 1.4  Construction of Lift Span on Burlington-Bristol Bridge.  
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Two of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first acts upon entering the presidency in 1933 were to 
increase funding for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), created by 
President Herbert C. Hoover in 1931, from $300 million to $3 billion and to create the 
Public Works Administration (PWA).  The experience Needles gained in New York City 
through interactions with bankers on revenue bond projects made him particularly adept 
at acquiring funds for infrastructure projects from the RFC and PWA in Washington, but 
it was his preparedness as an engineer by which necessary permits and plans awaited this 
financial opportunity.      
 
As the Great Depression came to a close and worldwide aggression culminated into 
World War II, 1941 marked a rebirth at the firm under a new partnership of Howard, 
Needles, Tammen & Bergendoff (HNTB).  Ruben N. Bergendoff’s persistence resulted 
in employment with the firm (i.e., Harrington, Howard & Ash) in 1922 despite 
Harrington’s warnings that “all of the big bridges have been built.”  After being laid off 
at the onset of the depression, Bergendoff returned to the firm’s Kansas City office in 
1933 as the chief designer of the 2,126-ft long South Omaha Bridge, a continuous 
warren through truss bridge over the Missouri River between Omaha, Nebraska and 
Council Bluffs, Iowa – proof that not all of the big bridges had been built.2  
 
The company’s role as predominantly a bridge design firm took a dramatic turn in 
response to the War Department’s need for the construction of military facilities during 
World War II.  HNTB soon came to oversee the development of facilities that included 
railways, airfield runways, highways, drainage structures, buildings water and 
wastewater systems, and gas and electrical distribution systems.  Experiences that came 
with wartime projects such as the Southwestern Proving Grounds in Hope, Arkansas and 
the Bluebonnet Ordinance Plant (Naval Weapons Industrial Reserve Plant) near Waco, 
Texas prepared the firm for an expanded role in the design of civil works. 
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Major work in the area of toll road design began when the newly formed Maine 
Turnpike Authority selected the firm as its consulting engineer near the end of World 
War II in 1945.  Unlike previous toll road projects in the United States, the Maine 
Turnpike was the first to be financed entirely with private capital, backed by revenue 
bond issues.  The success of this project provided bankers and public agencies with the 
confidence to pursue similar toll roads in other states.  HNTB was often selected to 
provide general engineering consultant (GEC) services based on the experiences the firm 
acquired by managing multiple teams of specialists during the development of military 
facilities for the War Department.  HNTB’s performance as GEC for the 118-mile New 
Jersey Turnpike (opened 1952), the firm’s first major project in this capacity, led to 
many subsequent GEC contracts, such as the Kansas City Turnpike and the Florida 
Turnpike (Figure 1.5).  With passage of the National Interstate and Defense Highway 
Act by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956 came the opportunity to apply its 
experience with turnpikes to the development of the interstate highway system.    
 
  
           Figure 1.5  Portion of Original 109-Mile Florida Turnpike.  
 
 
 
Previous experience in project finance and in the development of military facilities 
created additional business opportunities as passenger air travel began to grow during 
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the 1950s.  The firm’s initial consulting services to Miami International Airport on 
financial issues grew to include all aspects of airport design.  HNTB was able to apply 
its pavement design knowledge to major runway expansion projects at the airport 
(Figure 1.6), and capitalized on its ability to administer revenue bond programs by 
securing the role of GEC to the airport.  The firm’s long-term commitment to offering a 
full range of aviation services eventually materialized as a consolidation of aviation staff 
in its Alexandria, Virginia office in 1971. 
 
          
              Figure 1.6  Pavement Construction at Miami 
                     International Airport. 
 
 
 
Inevitable conflicts between infrastructure development and population growth in the 
United States culminated in a modern environmental movement that began in the late 
1960s.  The adverse effects of growing vehicle use on the expanding roadway network 
was perhaps first brought to the public’s attention by the 1969 blowout of an oil well off 
the coast of Santa Barbara, California.  In this event, the decision by Union Oil 
Company of California (Unocal) not to install well casing to sufficient depths from 
Platform Alpha resulted in a significant oil spill that polluted the Santa Barbara County 
shoreline.  Concern for air quality also grew during this time, first from large scale 
releases of pollutants by factories and power plants, and then from the shear numbers of 
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smaller releases by vehicles that used the extensive roadway network.  The National 
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) signed by Richard M. Nixon in 1969 represented 
a landmark shift toward national polices that would “encourage productive harmony 
between man and his environment.”3 
 
Along with NEPA, core provisions of the Clean Air Act (1970) and the Clean Water Act 
(1972) guided greater resources toward environmental quality and pollution remediation.  
In response to the new requirements mandated by these polices, HNTB expanded its 
services to include environmental consulting by acquiring the Indianapolis-based 
sanitary engineering consulting firm of Henry B. Steeg & Associates in 1973.  This 
acquisition gave the firm capabilities beyond the experience gained in preparing 
environmental impact studies for transportation projects, providing expertise in the 
unrelated but highly important area of water and wastewater treatment.2 
 
Other mergers and acquisitions during the 1970s expanded HNTB’s services in 
chemical, electrical and mechanical engineering (Frankfurter & Associates) and 
architecture (Kivett & Myers).  Although HNTB’s origins rest in the design of railroad 
bridges, it was not until the acquisition of T.K. Dyer in 1982 that it became a full-service 
firm to the railroad industry.  This addition brought expertise in track and signal design 
for railroad and public transit infrastructure, leading to work on projects such as the 
reconstruction of the Boston-to-Washington, DC high-speed rail corridor.     
 
1.2 HNTB Corporate Structure 
HNTB Corporation is an employee-owned organization comprised of Infrastructure, 
Architecture, and Federal Services practice areas.  The chief executive officer (CEO) of 
HNTB Corporation presides over the presidents of six divisions in addition to the chief 
sales officer, finance officer, contracting officer, and chief operations officer, as shown 
in Figure 1.7.  The chief sales officer guides the efforts of individuals that serve as 
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national marker sector leaders, who in turn facilitate interactions between the company 
and their respective markets and provide council to group leaders. 
 
As Figure 1.8 shows, the Austin office is a component of the South Central District of 
HNTB’s Central Division along with other offices in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi.  
Office leaders report to the Central Division President, who also presides over the 
division sales officer, business manager, human resources (HR) consultant, and 
operations officer. 
 
HNTB Holdings Ltd
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CEO
HNTB Holdings Ltd
President
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President
NE Division
President
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President
SE Division
President
West Division
President
Chief Sales
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•Aviation
•State DOTs
•Toll Roads
•Public Transit
•Freight Rail
•Federal Projects
Chief Operations
Officer
Finance
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National Market
Sectors
Professional
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•Bridges & Tunnels
•Construction Services
•Intelligent Transportation Systems
•Water Services
•Urban Design & Panning
•Program Management
Corp. Ventures
President
 
 
     Figure 1.7  HNTB Companies Corporate Structure. 
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Sales
Officer
North Central District
•Denver, CO
•Kansas City, MO
•Omaha, NE
•Overland Park, KS
•St. Louis, MO
Operations
Officer
Business
Manager
HR
Consultant
Office
Leaders
Division
President
South Central District
•Austin, TX
•Baton Rouge, LA
•Biloxi, MS
•Brownsville, TX
•Dallas, TX
•El Paso, TX
•Houston, TX
•New Orleans, LA
•San Antonio, TX  
           Figure 1.8  HNTB Corporation Central Division Structure. 
 
 
 
1.3 Description of Internship Position 
In January 2002, Texas Governor Rick Perry had presented the Texas Transportation 
Commission with a vision for a network of new multimodal corridors throughout the 
state, named the Trans-Texas Corridor (TTC).  The purpose of the Texas Department of 
Transportation (TxDOT) had historically been to plan, design, construct, and maintain 
the state’s roadway system, with virtually no emphasis on the planning and design of 
freight and passenger rail facilities that the TTC would require.  HNTB’s Texas Rail 
Group was established in Austin by Mr. Joe Lileikis two years later in order to provide 
the state with railroad expertise that was unavailable to the agency internally. 
 
The rail group has grown in the last several years to include a staff of nine engineers 
with expertise in railroad planning, civil site design, track design, railroad bridge design, 
and project feasibility assessment.  This group, with Mr. Lileikis now serving as HNTB 
Associate Vice President and Central Division Rail Market Sector Leader, is managed 
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by a team of engineers that average over 25 years of experience with Class I and 
shortline freight railroads, Amtrak’s northeast corridor, and engineering consulting firms 
that serve the rail industry.  Figure 1.9 shows the relationship between the rail group 
staff, the Austin office and Central Division management, and the client and market 
leadership. 
 
        
Rail Market
Sector Leader
Austin
Office
Client Service
Leaders
Rail
Group
Central
Division
BNSF Railway
KCS Railway
Union Pacific Railroad
TxDOT
 
                             Figure 1.9  HNTB Rail Group-Client Relationships. 
 
 
 
Rail projects performed at the Austin office have expanded beyond the TTC concept to 
include traditional engineering services such as the design and construction of new or 
relocated corridors, railroad bridge inspections, and the development of passenger rail 
systems.  As state populations and the need for transportation continue to grow, public 
agencies have become more interested in the evaluation of rail-related issues out of 
concern for the environment and public welfare.  Considering that freight and passenger 
rail transportation is fuel efficient, can relieve roadway congestion, and lessens the 
burden of pavement maintenance, rail infrastructure is now foreseen by the public sector 
as a solution to some of today’s transportation problems.  On the other hand, the spread 
of urban centers and the associated conflicts between the daily lives of their inhabitants 
and local railroad operations has heightened concerns over railroad-roadway grade 
crossing safety, roadway mobility, and exposure to the transport of hazardous materials 
(Figure 1.10).    
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             Figure 1.10  Railroad Tank Car used for Transport of Hydrochloric Acid. 
 
 
 
Public agencies have begun to seek the cooperation of private railroads in recent years as 
the interdependence of both sectors in creating safe and effective transportation systems 
becomes more apparent.  Public participation has gone even further through passage of 
legislation that permits the expenditure of public funds on rail infrastructure, such as the 
Texas Rail Relocation and Improvement Fund and the federal Rail Line Relocation and 
Improvement Capital Grants Program.  These legislative developments have created a 
need for new decision-making strategies that quantify the benefits of public sector rail 
investments to their costs and help formulate cost-sharing strategies for public-private 
partnerships.  The Doctor of Engineering internship, under the supervision of Mr. 
Lileikis, has focused on developing decision-making strategies that the Austin Rail 
Group can use to advise both public and private sector clients on rail infrastructure 
investments.   
 
1.4 Internship Objectives 
The primary intent of the Doctor of Engineering internship is to apply engineering 
analysis knowledge and skills to economic, financial, and risk assessments in a way that 
complements and strengthens the Austin Rail Group’s capabilities in rail planning and 
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design.  The work assignments and products completed during the internship are 
intended to enhance the company’s position as a comprehensive provider of rail services 
by elevating the decision-making capabilities of both public and private clients in their 
capital budgeting process.  The degree to which the intent of this internship has been met 
is structured around the completion of four fundamental objectives, as outlined below.  
Appendix A contains a final report submitted by Mr. Lileikis (the internship supervisor) 
that discusses the adequacy of each completed objective in meeting the needs of HNTB 
Corporation. 
 
Objective 1 
Rail relocation projects are usually proposed to eliminate train-automobile conflicts at 
grade crossings, and may involve the relocation of an entire rail corridor from a high 
population density area to a low population density area.  Models that are currently used 
to calculate the public costs associated with blocked grade crossings require broad 
assumptions to be made about train characteristics.  Furthermore, these models are 
generally intended to analyze specific grade crossings or, at most, a series of grade 
crossings on a rail corridor.  The relocation of a rail corridor within a rail network may 
actually alter railroad operations throughout the network, requiring each grade crossing 
in a region to be analyzed.  A new model capable of analyzing an entire rail network 
should use transportation engineering equations that have been adopted by governmental 
authorities in order to maintain the credibility of the results. Therefore, fulfillment of 
Objective 1 (Chapter II) is intended to: 
Demonstrate the effective transformation of standard mathematical 
solutions into equations and computational tools that meet the unique 
needs of industry. 
 
Objective 2 
The densification of urban populations around rail corridors has, in effect, increased the 
potential exposure of these populations to rail-transported hazardous materials.  While 
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railroads are required by law to provide service to shippers of hazardous materials, 
public agencies are seeking ways to reduce the risk of exposure to these materials.  Since 
the exposure to rail-transported hazardous materials has just recently become a major 
public issue, the analysis of this problem must establish how these risks are quantified 
and determine the most readily available means of mitigating the risks in light of public 
funding constraints.  The reasonableness of various mitigation strategies can be 
examined by applying available academic research to actual case studies as fulfillment 
of Objective 2 (Chapter III), which is intended to: 
Demonstrate an appropriate selection and application of published 
literature to evaluate the effects of proposed transportation policy. 
 
Objective 3 
The loss of a timber railroad bridge due to fire occurs more frequently than might be 
expected.  This problem might be viewed as strictly a private-sector concern if it were 
not for the fact that the financial distress caused by a bridge loss could force a 
marginally profitable railroad out of business, requiring freight that was previously 
shipped by rail to use the roadway system.  While performing a risk analysis of a 
specific railroad’s finances is impractical, particularly when considering the proprietary 
information that would be needed, a generic model can be prepared that provides insight 
to the potential for financial distress.  The development of this model represents 
fulfillment of Objective 3 (Chapter IV), which is intended to: 
Use accounting principles to transform inventories of infrastructure data 
into relative financial risks associated with a corporation’s loss of a 
physical asset. 
 
Objective 4 
The railroad industry’s cost of capital is an important determinant in establishing 
revenue adequacy for rail line abandonment cases, resolving disputes on shipping rates, 
negotiating trackage rights, and in reviewing merger applications.  The analysis of 
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engineering projects is typically more focused on identifying relevant cash flows than 
with determining an appropriate discount rate, particularly when the analysis is 
performed within an organization where the cost of capital is known internally.  In cases 
where consulting services are provided to both a public and private sector client, as in 
the case of a public-private partnership, the engineer must rely on publicly available 
information when selecting discount rates for an economic analysis.  Fortunately, 
sufficient information exists to determine cost of capital when the private sector client is 
a public company.  The application of public information to evaluate projects from the 
perspective of corporations represents fulfillment of Objective 4 (Chapter V), which is 
intended to: 
Apply methodologies used in financial markets to the development of 
parameters required to perform engineering economic analyses. 
 
1.5 Organization of this Record of Study 
The outline of the record of study is as follows: 
• Chapter I – Introduction 
? HNTB Corporate History 
? HNTB Corporate Structure 
? Description of Internship Position 
? Internship Objectives 
• Chapter II – Simulation-Based Regional Grade Crossing Analysis 
? FRA Impedance Analysis Method 
? Rationale for a New Approach 
? An Alternative Impedance Analysis Method 
? Application of the Alternative Methodology 
− Example Cases 
? Academic and Industry Observations 
• Chapter III – Application of Risk Assessment to Public Policy 
? Hazardous Materials Exposure Risk Factors 
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? Emergency Response Actions 
? Probability of Hazardous Material Release 
? Railroad Corridor Exposure Risk 
? Approaches to Exposure Risk Mitigation 
− Example Cases 
? Academic and Industry Observations 
• Chapter IV – Financial Risk of a Timber Railroad Bridge Catastrophe 
? Risk Assessment Methodology 
? Incorporation of Industry Data 
? Trend Analysis 
? Applications of the Methodology 
? Academic and Industry Observations 
• Chapter V – Use of Financial Market Data in Railroad Negotiations 
? Calculating Cost of Capital 
− Cost of Equity 
− Cost of Capital 
? Application of Cost of Capital to Negotiations 
− Net Present Value Analysis 
? Academic and Industry Observations 
• Chapter VI – Summary and Conclusions 
? Summary 
? Conclusions 
• Appendix A – Final Report by the Internship Supervisor 
• Appendix B – Sample Grade Crossing Analysis Computer Code 
• Appendix C – Hazardous Materials List 
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CHAPTER II  
 
SIMULATION-BASED REGIONAL GRADE CROSSING ANALYSIS  
 
As the boundaries and population densities of urban areas continue to grow, conflicts 
between trains and automobile traffic at highway-rail grade crossings become more 
burdensome to society.  Measurement of the time that vehicles are impeded by trains at 
these grade crossings is inexact due to the variability of both vehicle and train traffic that 
occur on a daily and, in fact, hourly basis.  Yet the public sector has begun to focus more 
attention on reducing grade crossing conflicts and finds it important to understand the 
real societal costs of impedance before spending scarce resources at any one location.  
Practical approaches to calculating impedance are constrained by the degree of accuracy 
in traffic data and the level of effort that can be committed to an analysis.  
 
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has made considerable advancements over 
time in providing state and local authorities with a practical means of measuring grade 
crossing impedance with its GradeDec.Net program.  This web-based application is 
intended to be used as an investment analysis tool in support of the resource allocation 
decisions faced by transportation officials.4 The FRA methodology uses impedance and 
safety as the two primary sources of public cost associated with vehicle-train 
interactions, with distinctly separate methods of denominating their effects on society.  
Despite the advances made in measuring the effects of grade crossing impedance, this 
methodology is not well suited to the analysis of investments in railroad infrastructure 
that affect entire rail networks, such as with the construction of a rail bypass around a 
metropolitan area. 
 
This chapter presents a new grade crossing analysis methodology that can be used to 
efficiently analyze an entire rail network while preserving the mathematics behind the 
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transportation engineering equations adopted by the FRA.  The information in this 
chapter fulfills Objective 1, which is intended to: 
Demonstrate the effective transformation of standard mathematical 
solutions into equations and computational tools that meet the unique 
needs of industry. 
 
2.1 FRA Impedance Analysis Method 
Conflicts between trains and automobile traffic at highway-rail grade crossings are 
predicted using roadway traffic data on file with public agencies and train data either 
provided by railroad companies or compiled through independent observation.  
Differentiation of the roadway traffic mix in GradeDec.Net is made according to 
percentages of cars, trucks, and buses within the average daily traffic (ADT).  A 
convenient aspect of using ADT data is the ease with which the mix of vehicle types can 
be converted to an equivalent number of standard vehicles that are likely to interact with 
train traffic, resulting in delay time and time-in-queue estimates in units of vehicle-
hours.  These volumes are ultimately used to estimate arrival rates and build-up rates of 
queues at blocked grade crossings.   
 
The FRA bases traffic arrival and departure patterns at a blocked roadway on equations 
derived from a simplified form of queuing theory for a roadway bottleneck.  Figure 2.1 
illustrates the simplified model for the upstream behavior of an undersaturated traffic 
signal (same as a blocked grade crossing), based on a vehicle arrival rate (λ), departure 
rate (µ), and free flow speed (v).5 The extent of roadway queuing is shown by a 
progression in cumulative numbers of vehicles affected during queue build-up (B1) and a 
constant number of vehicles affected during restoration to free flow speed (B2). Figure 
2.1 also shows that D1 represents the number of dispersed vehicles (zero vehicles) while 
the grade crossing is blocked (point L to point J), and D2 represents the cumulative 
number of dispersed vehicles that have returned to free flow speed. 
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             Figure 2.1  Traffic Arrival and Departure Patterns at Blocked Roadway.  
 
 
 
Delay time represents the time required for a vehicle to traverse a blocked grade crossing 
in excess of the time that would be required if no train had impeded its progress.  Time-
in-queue is equal to the time that a vehicle actually spends waiting in a queue at the 
blocked grade crossing, and has been shown to be a fixed multiple of delay.6 Together, 
delay time and time-in-queue represent the temporal measure of impeded vehicle 
mobility.  The basic train characteristic used by the FRA to determine grade crossing 
impedance is the crossing block time (CBT) for a specified time interval – grade crossing 
safety, on the other hand, is a function of train volume and maximum allowable track 
speed.  Of the two impedance measures, delay time is used to determine the cost of time 
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wasted by motorists at blocked grade crossings, and time-in queue is used to determine 
the cost of fuel and oil consumed and engine emissions released by vehicles that are 
queued at the blocked crossing.  
 
Grade Crossing Block Time 
The FRA methodology characterizes railroad events at grade crossings by calculating a 
separate CBT (in minutes) for passenger, freight, and switch trains.  Since variability in 
train length (Ltr) and train speed (Str) is expected, average lengths and speeds are 
assumed for each of these three train types when calculating CBT using Eq. 2.1. 
60
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An average crossing block time (ACBT) is used in the remainder of FRA delay and time-
in-queue equations, based on a weighted average of the CBT for numbers of passenger 
(np), freight (nf), and switch (ns) trains (Eq. 2.2).4 Consequently, the total time that 
vehicles are prevented from entering a grade crossing is a weighted average of average 
block times for three discrete train types. 
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Delay Time and Time-in-Queue 
ACBT is used to determine the number of vehicles per lane affected by a blocked 
crossing (NK) using Eq. 2.3.  The vehicle departure rate (µ) is assumed constant at 0.5 
vehicles/lane-second, while the average vehicle arrival rate (λ) is found using Eq. 2.4. 
λµ
λµ
−=
ACBTN K
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( ) )3600(/)( periodhrslanes
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The passenger car equivalents (PCE) in Eq. 2.4 is equal to the average daily traffic 
(ADT) on the roadway multiplied by the sum of percent cars, 1.8 times the percent 
trucks, and 2.73 times the percent buses in the vehicle mix.  Delay time (w) is then 
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calculated according to the FRA equation shown as Eq. 2.5, and time-in-queue (tq) is 
calculated according to Eq. 2.6.   
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The calculation of time-in-queue in Eq. 2.6 is a function of the rate of growth at the back 
of the queue (z), shown as Eq. 2.7.  This rate of growth is controlled by the free flow 
vehicle speed (v) of the roadway and a vehicle queue density (k) assumed constant at 
0.05 vehicles/lane-foot.  
λ
λ
−= vk
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2.2 Rationale for a New Approach 
The FRA methodology bases delay time and time-in-queue calculations on a weighted 
average of block times for passenger, freight, and switch trains (Eq. 2.2).  Each of these 
block times are themselves a function of an average train length and train speed per train 
type (i.e., passenger, freight, and switch).  Restricting the analysis to three pre-defined 
train types requires the use of averaging at a level that unnecessarily generalizes train 
behavior, perhaps for the sake of avoiding what is foreseen as a highly iterative process. 
 
Considering that delay time (Eq. 2.5) and time-in-queue (Eq. 2.6) are functions of both 
ACBT and NK, and that NK is itself a function of ACBT, any deviation in ACBT from the 
true grade crossing block time will be magnified when the term is squared (i.e., inserting 
Eq. 2.3 into Eq. 2.5 and Eq. 2.6).  The generalization of train behavior using ACBT may 
be even less desirable when performing a major investment study on the construction of 
a rail bypass around a metropolitan area.  Rail bypasses are designed to accommodate 
freight trains that would otherwise pass through the metropolitan area (e.g., intermodal, 
grain, etc.) while freight trains that service local customers (e.g., coal, rock, etc.) remain 
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active on the original lines.  For these projects, transportation officials may desire a more 
accurate description of the effects that each train type has on grade crossing impedance.   
 
The accuracy of delay time and time-in-queue calculations using the FRA methodology 
in Eq. 2.5 and Eq. 2.6 are dependent on how well roadway and train parameters 
represent actual train-vehicle interactions at a grade crossing.  GradeDec.Net typically 
captures fluctuations in vehicle traffic over 24 hours by distributing ADT among four 
six-hour periods of equal duration (early AM, late AM, early PM, and late PM), where 
one of the unique distribution profiles of vehicle traffic shown in Figure 2.2 is selected 
by the GradeDec.Net user.  For example, the “AM Peak” distribution profile assumes 
that 50 percent of ADT occurs between 6 AM and 12 PM.   
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               Figure 2.2  GradeDec.Net Traffic Distribution Profiles. 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 includes sample train data for a rail corridor similar to that compiled by the 
Austin Rail Group in the assessment of a regional rail network in Texas.  In this 
particular sample, all trains would be classified in GradeDec.Net as either freight or 
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switch trains despite the fact that some of these train events are actually only yard engine 
moves.  Regardless of how each of these train events are grouped into freight and switch 
train categories, each group would have significant variability in both train length and 
train speed.  For example, consolidating local, work/power, and yard engine movements 
in Table 2.1 into the switch train category would require a statistical distribution of 
switch train length that captures a variation of 2,000 feet, and a distribution of freight 
train length that captures a variation of 3,400 feet.  Since the FRA methodology also 
uses a single average speed to describe freight train movements and a single average 
speed to describe switch train movements, the level of detail provided in Table 2.1 
would unnecessarily be generalized when calculating ACBT. 
 
Table 2.1  Sample Train Data for Single Rail Corridor. 
     
Auto 4 30.4 6000
Manifest 16 25.5 7200
Intermodal 6 24.6 6300
Shortline 1 13.6 5000
Priority Manifest 16 26.6 5200
Loaded Coal 3 20.2 7200
Empty Coal 3 26.2 7200
Empty Grain 3 26.0 6000
Loaded Grain 3 23.2 6000
Other Unit 1 31.4 3800
Local 3 18.2 2500
Work/Power 1 13.9 1300
Yard Engine 6 8.9 50
Train Type Daily Train Count
Train 
Speed 
(mph)
Train 
Length    
(ft)
 
 
 
 
GradeDec.Net uses probability distributions for the train length and train speed of each 
train type to describe the variability in CBT for passenger, freight, and switch trains in 
Eq. 2.2.4  However, Table 2.1 shows that the variability in these parameters can be quite 
large when numerous train types must be generalized according to only three train types.  
GradeDec.Net then uses a single ACBT to calculate delay time and time-in-queue at a 
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grade crossing, which is then multiplied by the total number of daily trains at a 
percentage of these trains that operate during the appropriate six-hour time period (early 
AM, late AM, early PM, and late PM). 
   
2.3 Alternative Impedance Analysis Method  
The current FRA methodology unnecessarily generalizes train events by classifying all 
train operations according to passenger, freight, or switch service.  Rather than assigning 
average values to these three train types, each discrete train event on record can be 
incorporated into impedance calculations by separating roadway parameters from train 
parameters in Eq. 2.5 and Eq. 2.6. 
 
The incorporation of discrete train events into grade crossing impedance calculations 
implies that actual crossing block times will be used instead of an average crossing block 
time; that is, the methodology should be based on a collection of CBT values as opposed 
to an ACBT.  Therefore, the number of vehicles affected by a blocked crossing (NK) first 
shown as Eqn. 3 is now a function of CBT, as shown as Eq. 2.8.  
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For the case of delay time, Eqn. 2.8 is substituted into Eq. 2.5 to give Eq. 2.9. 
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The bracketed terms in Eq. 2.9 can be expressed as shown in Eq. 2.10.  
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Eq. 2.10 is expanded to give: 
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The numerical values in Eq. 2.11 are reduced and roadway parameters are isolated from 
CBT as follows:  
26 
CBTlanesCBTlanesw 



−

 −+






−

 −+−= )(120
11
)(2
11 2
2
22
λµ
λµ
λµλµ
µλ
λµλµ
λµ ... (2.12) 
Eq. 2.12 can be rewritten in terms of CBT and coefficients α and β, which are strictly 
functions of FRA roadway parameters, to express delay time as shown in Eq. 2.13.  
Units for the coefficients α and β are vehicle-hours/min2 and vehicle-hours/min, 
respectively. 
CBTCBTw βα += 2 ................................................................................... (2.13) 
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The case of time-in-queue (Eq. 2.16) has the same form as delay time (Eq. 2.13), but 
with z substituted for λ in coefficients α and β as shown in Eq. 2.17 and Eq. 2.18. 
CBTCBTtq βα += 2 ....................................................................................... (2.16) 
Where, 
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Since the CBT used to calculate delay time (Eq. 2.13) and time-in-queue (Eq. 2.16) is for 
a single train event, whereas the FRA methodology uses ACBT to represent all train 
events, total impedance can be represented as the sum of impedance values for each 
discrete train event.  Using delay time as an example, total delay time (wT) can be 
expressed as the summation of the numbers of trains for each train type (ni) times the 
delay time for each train type (wi) for all train types (N), as shown in Eq. 2.19.   
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Substituting Eq. 2.13 into Eq. 2.19 gives the modified solution to delay time, as follows: 
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Since the FRA methodology captures fluctuations in vehicle data by distributing traffic 
volumes according to time periods, and since α and β are constant for a given time 
period (i.e., ADT is constant), wT for a specific time period can be determined using Eq. 
2.21.  The solution described for delay time in Eq. 21 is also applicable to time-in-queue 
except that Eq. 2.17 and Eq. 2.18 are used to calculate α and β instead of Eq. 2.14 and 
Eq. 2.15. 
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2.4 Application of Alternative Methodology 
Three cases are examined that compares the FRA methodology to the modified solution 
for calculating delay time presented in Eq. 2.20.  In each case, a single grade crossing is 
evaluated assuming an ADT of 2,400 cars (no trucks or buses), one lane, and a free flow 
speed of 35 mph. 
 
Case 1: Single Freight Train 
A single 7,000-foot freight train operates at 25 mph during the early PM over a grade 
crossing having an “AM Peak” distribution of vehicle traffic (see Figure 2.2).  The 
allocation of vehicles over four six-hour time periods for a grade crossing of 2,400 ADT 
is shown in Table 2.2, which shows that 840 vehicles enter the grade crossing during the 
early PM. 
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     Table 2.2  Vehicle Traffic Distributions for Case 1. 
                   
Time Period Time Window Distribution of ADT Vehicles
Early AM 12AM - 6AM 0.10 240
Late AM 6AM - 12PM 0.50 1200
Early PM 12PM - 6PM 0.35 840
Late PM 6PM - 12AM 0.05 120  
 
 
 
Delay time is calculated using the FRA methodology as follows:    
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Delay time is calculated using the modified solution as follows: 
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Thus, Case 1 shows that the FRA methodology (Eq. 2.5) and the modified solution (Eq. 
2.13) yield the same delay time (0.2700 vehicle-hours) since there can be no 
generalization of train behavior for a single train event.    
 
Case 2: Single Freight and Switch plus Freight Trains 
In addition to the single 7,000-foot freight train operating at 25 mph in the early PM in 
Case 1, a single 50-foot yard engine and a 7,000-foot freight train operates over the same 
grade crossing during the late AM.  Table 2.2 shows that 1,200 vehicles enter the grade 
crossing during the late AM when the combined yard engine plus freight train activity 
occurs.  Therefore, the events in each time period are accompanied by different roadway 
parameters as a result of unique vehicle arrival rates (see Eq. 2.4). 
 
The CBT for a 7,000-foot freight train operating at 25 mph has been calculated in Case 1 
as 3.7818 minutes.  A similar calculation for a 50-foot yard engine operating at nine mph 
yields a CBT of 0.6631 minutes.  Since both train types operate in the late AM time 
period, the FRA methodology requires the calculation of ACBT (Eq. 2.2) as follows: 
2225.2
2
)6631.0)(1()7818.3)(1( =+=ACBT  
Results based on the FRA methodology are summarized in Table 2.3, including the 
ACBT of 2.22 minutes during the late AM and a CBT (i.e. a single train event) of 3.78 
minutes during the early PM.  The ACBT for the weighted average of a switch and 
freight train event during the late AM yields a delay time of 0.1358 vehicle-hours, and 
the CBT for the single freight train event during the early PM yields a delay time of 
0.2700 vehicle-hours (same as Case 1).  
 
     Table 2.3  FRA Methodology Delay Time Parameters for Case 2. 
Time 
Period Train Event
Train Length 
(ft)
Train Speed 
(mph)
ACBT     
(min)
λ       
(veh/ln-sec)
N K      
(veh/ln)
w        
(veh-hr)
Early AM none - - - - - -
Late AM Engine & Freight 50 & 7000 9 & 25 2.2225 0.0556 8.3345 0.1358
Early PM Freight 7000 25 3.7818 0.0389 9.5684 0.2700
Late PM none - - - - - -  
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Since delay times in Table 2.3 represent the effect of a single train event, total delay time 
(wT) for a specific time period is the product of delay time (w) and the number of trains 
(n) in that period.  The number of trains in a single time period using the FRA 
methodology is inclusive of all train types (i.e., passenger, freight, and switch), so the 
total delay time during late AM is: 
wT = (2)(0.1358) = 0.2716 
The total delay time during early PM is: 
wT = (1)(0.2700) = 0.2700 
 
Table 2.4 summarizes the roadway parameters needed to calculate delay using the 
modified solution, where the α and β roadway coefficients for the early PM time period 
are the same as in Case 1.  The respective CBT for the yard engine and freight trains are 
0.6631 minutes and 3.7818 minutes, so the total delay time during the late AM using the 
modified solution (Eq. 2.21) is: 
wT = (0.03125)[(1)(0.6631)2 + (1)(3.7818)2] + (-0.00833)[(1)(0.6631) + (1)(3.78)] 
     = 0.4237 
The total delay time during early PM using the modified solution is:     
wT = 0.02108[(1)(3.7818)2] + (-0.00833)[(1)(3.7818)] = 0.2700 
 
Case 2 shows that the FRA methodology (Eq. 2.5) and the modified solution (Eq. 2.21) 
yield the same total delay time for early PM (0.2700 vehicle-hours) since there is a 
single train event in that time period.  However, the two methods yield different total 
delay times for late AM since more than one train type operates in that time period. 
 
The FRA methodology bases delay time on a weighted average block time (Eq. 2.2), 
which is multiplied by two train events to yield a total delay time of 0.2716 vehicle-
hours during late AM.  In contrast, the modified solution essentially sums the delay 
times of each train type to give a total delay time of 0.4237 vehicle-hours during the 
same time period.  Since the modified solution uses exact block times for each train 
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event, the FRA methodology is shown to unnecessarily underestimate total delay time in 
the late AM by 36 percent.       
 
     Table 2.4  Modified Solution Delay Time Parameters for Case 2. 
                       
12AM-6AM 6AM-12PM 12PM-6PM 6PM-12AM
Distribution 0.10 0.50 0.35 0.05
PCE 240 1200 840 120
k (veh/ft-ln) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
µ (veh/sec-ln) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
λ (veh/sec-ln) 0.0111 0.0556 0.0389 0.0056
α (veh-hr/min2) 0.00568 0.03125 0.02108 0.00281
β (veh-hr/min) -0.00833 -0.00833 -0.00833 -0.00833
Roadway 
Parameter
Time-of-Day
 
 
 
 
Case 3: Multiple Trains and Train Types 
Case 3 is based on the sample train data shown in Table 2.1. This data is presented again 
in Table 2.5 with assumed distribution profiles for each train type according to the four 
six-hour time periods used in GradeDec.Net.  For example, each of the four daily auto 
trains operates on the corridor in different time periods, resulting in a uniform 
distribution of 25 percent in each period.  Each train type in Table 2.5 could be 
subdivided according to differences in train speeds and train lengths, but Case 3 assumes 
that these parameters are essentially constant.  Alternatively, statistical distributions of 
train speed and train length could be applied to each train type, which would likely 
contain less variability than statistical distributions currently used to describe 
generalized train behavior for passenger, freight, and switch classifications. 
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                  Table 2.5  Assumed Daily Distributions of Trains for Case 3. 
12AM-6AM 6AM-12PM 12PM-6PM 6PM-12AM
Auto 4 30.4 6000 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Manifest 16 25.5 7200 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Intermodal 6 24.6 6300 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.33
Shortline 1 13.6 5000 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Priority Manifest 16 26.6 5200 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Loaded Coal 3 20.2 7200 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00
Empty Coal 3 26.2 7200 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.33
Empty Grain 3 26.0 6000 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.33
Loaded Grain 3 23.2 6000 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00
Other Unit 1 31.4 3800 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Local 3 18.2 2500 0.00 0.33 0.67 0.00
Work/Power 1 13.9 1300 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Yard Engine 6 8.9 50 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00
Train 
Length     
(ft)
Time-of-Day Distribution Profiles
Train Type Daily Train Count
Train 
Speed 
(mph)
        
 
 
 
The FRA methodology requires each train listed in Table 2.5 to be defined as either 
freight or switch trains (there are no passenger trains in this example).  Table 2.6 
includes the likely list of freight trains with statistics summarizing the train count, 
average speed, and average length for each time period; Table 2.7 includes the likely list 
of switch trains and train statistics. 
 
                  Table 2.6  FRA Methodology Freight Train Statistics for Case 3. 
          
12AM-6AM 6AM-12PM 12PM-6PM 6PM-12AM
Auto 1 1 1 1
Manifest 4 4 4 4
Intermodal 2 0 2 2
Shortline 0 1 0 0
Priority Manifest 4 4 4 4
Loaded Coal 1 1 1 0
Empty Coal 0 1 1 1
Empty Grain 0 1 1 1
Loaded Grain 1 1 1 0
Other Unit 0 0 1 0
Totals 13 14 16 13
Avg. Speed (mph) 25.5 24.9 25.9 26.2
Avg. Length (ft) 6261 6214 6150 6261
Train Type Freight Train Counts
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      Table 2.7  FRA Methodology Switch Train Statistics for Case 3. 
          
12AM-6AM 6AM-12PM 12PM-6PM 6PM-12AM
Local 0 1 2 0
Work/Power 0 0 1 0
Yard Engine 0 3 3 0
Totals 0 4 6 0
Avg. Speed (mph) - 11.2 12.8 -
Avg. Length (ft) - 662 1075 -
Train Type Switch Train Counts
 
 
 
         
Table 2.8 summarizes the parameters necessary for calculating delay time using the FRA 
methodology, where ACBT (Eq. 2.2) for each time period is the weighted average block 
time based on the train counts, average speeds, and average lengths of freight and switch 
trains listed in Tables 2.6 and 2.7.    
 
      Table 2.8  FRA Methodology Delay Time Parameters for Case 3. 
           
12AM-6AM 6AM-12PM 12PM-6PM 6PM-12AM
ACBT (min) 3.39 2.96 2.82 3.32
λ (veh/sec-ln) 0.0111 0.0556 0.0389 0.0056
NK (veh/ln) 2.31 11.09 7.13 1.12
n  (trains) 13 18 22 13
w  (veh-hr) 0.0371 0.2489 0.1441 0.0033
w T  (veh-hr) 0.4819 4.4783 3.1684 0.0427
FRA Parameter FRA Methodology Calculations
 
 
 
 
In addition to evaluating each time period separately, total daily delay time is found by 
summing the results in Table 2.8 as follows: 
wT = 0.4819 + 4.4783 + 3.1684 + 0.0427 = 8.1713  
 
The modified solution in Case 3 uses each discrete train event rather than statistical 
averages of freight and switch train classifications.  This method matches the α and β 
roadway coefficients in Table 2.4 to each train event in Table 2.5. 
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               Table 2.9  Modified Solution Delay Times for Case 3. 
       
12AM-6AM 6AM-12PM 12PM-6PM 6PM-12AM
Auto 4 2.84 0.0222 0.2289 0.1467 0.0000
Manifest 16 3.81 0.2027 1.6862 1.0964 0.0360
Intermodal 6 3.51 0.0814 0.0000 0.4606 0.0107
Shortline 1 4.78 0.0000 0.6735 0.0000 0.0000
Priority Manifest 16 2.82 0.0869 0.9010 0.5773 0.0000
Loaded Coal 3 4.65 0.0840 0.6364 0.4168 0.0000
Empty Coal 3 3.72 0.0000 0.4017 0.2609 0.0079
Empty Grain 3 3.22 0.0000 0.2973 0.1919 0.0023
Loaded Grain 3 3.54 0.0416 0.3615 0.2343 0.0000
Other Unit 1 1.98 0.0000 0.0000 0.0658 0.0000
Local 3 2.16 0.0000 0.1278 0.1609 0.0000
Work/Power 1 1.66 0.0000 0.0000 0.0444 0.0000
Yard Engine 6 0.66 0.0000 0.0247 0.0113 0.0000
w T  (veh-hr) 0.5189 5.3391 3.6674 0.0569
Daily 
Count
CBT      
(min/train)
Modified Solution CalculationsTrain Type
 
 
 
     
Results for the modified solution are listed in Table 2.9 for each train type, where Eq. 
2.20 is used to calculate delay times for each time period.  Total daily delay time is 
found by summing the results in Table 9 as follows: 
wT = 0.5189 + 5.3391 + 3.6674 + 0.0569 = 9.5824  
 
Thus, the modified solution yields a total daily delay time of 9.58 vehicle-hours while 
the FRA methodology yields a total daily delay time of 8.17 vehicle-hours, a difference 
of 1.41 vehicle-hours per day under the grade crossing conditions assumed in these 
demonstration cases.  Delay times for Case 3 based on the FRA methodology were 
consistently lower than delay times based on the modified solution for each of the four 
six-hour time periods, ranging from 7.1 percent lower during early AM to 25.1 percent 
lower during late PM.  Consequently, the generalization of train behavior from what are 
actually diverse sets of field data (e.g., Table 2.5) can result in considerable 
underestimation of delay time. 
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2.5 Academic and Industry Observations 
Objective 1 was established to address the Austin Rail Group’s need to analyze the 
effects of capital investments that the public sector has recently proposed as a means of 
reducing highway-railroad grade crossing conflicts within large urban areas.  These 
projects usually involve re-routing trains over new rail bypasses that consequently 
modify railroad operations on all existing corridors.  Therefore, the effect of operational 
changes to a regional rail network requires a systems analysis, usually in the form of 
computer simulation, which produces large volumes of train data.  The FRA 
GradeDec.Net model is tailored to small numbers of grade crossings and a few 
representative train types and, thus, is not well suited to the obligation of a consulting 
firm to its client – to provide an economic analysis that is grounded in sound engineering 
practice and adheres to the budget.  In this particular case, adherence to sound 
engineering practice was demonstrated by integrating transportation engineering 
formulas that have been adopted by the governing agency (the FRA) into useful 
mathematical forms that provide clients with information of improved reliability at no 
greater cost. 
 
A principle medium in which mathematical transformations have been emphasized in the 
Doctor of Engineering program is through theoretical coursework such as foundation 
and geotechnical engineering.  For example, advanced foundation engineering requires 
the application of plasticity theory toward the derivation of bearing capacity equations 
suited to particular design scenarios.  As with all engineering analyses, however, the 
accuracy of both the original and proposed grade crossing analysis methodologies are 
subject to the quality of information.  Failure to properly simulate rail network 
operations or adjust for variability in roadway traffic volumes will lessen the degree of 
accuracy in these analyses.  In contrast to a research oriented program, the Doctor of 
Engineering internship emphasizes the practical application of new developments, where 
computational models conform to existing software applications.  As a result, rather than 
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constructing a computer model using a code such as that outlined in Appendix B, a 
similar model was constructed for the Austin Rail Group using Microsoft Excel. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
APPLICATION OF RISK ASSESSMENT TO PUBLIC POLICY 
 
In addition to the exposure of automobiles to trains at highway-rail grade crossings, the 
densification of urban populations has also increased the exposure of the public to rail-
transported hazardous materials.  The transport of these materials has been essential to 
the functioning of the U.S. economy, delivering chemicals used to purifying drinking 
water, grow agricultural products, support industrial and manufacturing processes, and 
meet other needs demanded by society.  The railroads carry close to two million 
shipments of hazardous materials each year, and are required to provide this service 
upon reasonable request as part of their common carrier obligation.7  Nevertheless, the 
heightened concerns for national security in the early 2000s drew attention to the risks 
posed by shipments of hazardous materials by rail, prompting the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), in consultation with the FRA and 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), to propose revisions to existing 
regulations. 
 
A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was issued by PHMSA in December 2006 regarding 
the enhancement of rail transportation safety and security for hazardous materials 
shipments, the primary intention of which was to require each railroad company to 
compile more extensive records on specific shipments of hazardous materials and 
analyze the safety and security risks along their respective routes.7  The proposed 
rulemaking also intended for the railroads to assess alternative routing options and base 
their routing decisions according to this perceived level of safety and security risk.  The 
public entities soon took the initiative to perform their own assessments of routing 
alternatives, often including the construction of new rail corridors around urban centers 
as a means of reduce the risk of exposure to hazardous materials. 
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In April 2007 the National Capital Planning Commission, which is charged with central 
planning for federal land and buildings in the Washington, DC area, completed a study 
that assessed the feasibility of reducing hazardous materials-related risk by constructing 
new rail alignments outside of the National Capitol vicinity.8  At the state level, a bill 
prepared by the 80th Texas Legislature was enacted into law in June 2007 requiring a 
similar rail study to be prepared.  Texas House Bill 160 called for an investigation into 
the economic feasibility of relocating freight trains that carry hazardous materials away 
from residential areas for municipalities having a population greater than 1.2 million.9      
 
This chapter examines the economics of making different types of rail infrastructure 
investments to reduce the risk of exposure to hazardous materials.  The analysis 
provided in this chapter fulfills Objective 2, which is intended to: 
Demonstrate an appropriate selection and application of published 
literature to evaluate the effects of proposed transportation policy. 
 
3.1 Hazardous Materials Exposure Risk Factors 
The transport of hazardous materials without incident, or the release of a hazardous 
material in an uninhabited area, essentially poses no risk to humans.  For urban areas, 
however, the potential exposure to a release of hazardous material increases in 
proportion to the population density and the likelihood that an event will occur.  The 
eventuality of a rail-related hazardous material incident could be attributed to a number 
of safety factors faced by the railroads.  Figure 3.1 shows the proportions of causes that 
the FRA has attributed to train accidents from 2001 to 2006, indicating that track 
condition and human factors caused almost 72 percent of all train accidents during this 
period.  The FRA has further concluded that nearly all accidents resulting in the release 
of a hazardous material are due to a derailment (i.e., track condition) or human factor.10  
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Track 34% 
Signal 2%
Equipment 12%
Human Factors 38%Miscellaneous 14%
 
Figure 3.1  Causes of Non-Grade Crossing Train Accidents, 2001-2006. 
 
 
 
Of the two most relevant performance-related risk factors (i.e., track condition and 
human factors), track condition is most interrelated to the issue of rail infrastructure 
investment.  Tangible factors such as the location of a rail line and the frequency in 
which hazardous materials are transported also play a major role in the degree of risk to 
urban areas.  Human factors, while a crucial element of rail safety, is less directly 
associated with physical measures of infrastructure and are by definition influenced by 
parameters such as the experience and alertness of the engineer.       
 
The FRA correlates track condition to sets of criteria for five track classes.  Parameters 
such as track gage tolerance, numbers of good ties, rail surface condition, and track 
alignment dictate the maximum speed at which freight and passenger trains are allowed 
travel, as prescribed in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) under 49 CFR 213 – 
Track Safety Standards.11 Table 3.1 lists the maximum allowable speed for both freight 
and passenger trains, where a higher track class corresponds to higher quality track 
conditions. 
 
 
 
40 
 
      Table 3.1  Maximum Allowable Train Speeds per Track Class. 
           
Track Class
Freight     
Train Speed 
(mph)
Passenger 
Train Speed 
(mph)
Excepted Track 10 not allowed
Class 1 10 15
Class 2 25 30
Class 3 40 60
Class 4 60 80
Class 5 80 90  
 
 
 
As should be expected, railroad accident data shows that fewer incidents occur on higher 
quality track (i.e., higher track classes).  Table 3.2 lists information compiled by the 
FRA’s Office of Safety on freight train accidents involving derailments from 1992 to 
2001.12 This information shows that the numbers of cars derailed per billion car-miles 
drops significantly as track class increases even though trains operate at significantly 
higher speeds over higher quality track, reflected by the higher average speeds during an 
accident at higher track classes.   
 
       Table 3.2  Freight Train Accident Speeds and Derailment Rates, 1992-2001. 
     
FRA Track Class 1 2 3 4 5
Maximum Track Speed (mph) 10 25 40 60 80
Average Speed (mph) 8.7 17.7 26.3 33.6 37.0
Cars Derailed per 109 car-miles 3979 726 300 77 42  
 
 
 
3.2 Emergency Response Actions 
For the purpose of investigation a hazardous material is considered to be any substance 
that requires an emergency response when released into the environment.  The U.S. 
Department of Transportation lists over 400 chemicals in the Emergency Response 
Guidebook (ERG), which is a guide for first responders during the initial phase of a 
hazardous material incident.13 As an example, Table 3.3 includes the first seven 
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hazardous materials listed in the ERG (see Appendix C for a full listing).  The 
emergency response number is an ERG designation used for easy identification of each 
chemical and to distinguish between chemical compounds of similar composition, such 
as bromine (1744) and bromine trifluoride (1746).  The name or emergency response 
number of each hazardous material directs emergency personnel to a specific section of 
the ERG that outlines the response action required in the event of a release. 
 
      Table 3.3  Hazardous Materials Classifications and Protective Action Distances. 
   
Day      
(mi)
Night     
(mi)
Day      
(mi)
Night     
(mi)
Ammonia, anhydrous 1005 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.4
Boron trifloride 1008 2.3 0.1 0.4 1.1 3.0
Carbon monoxide 1016 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.5
Chlorine 1017 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.6
Coal gas 1023 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Cyanogen 1026 2.3 0.2 0.8 0.7 2.7
Ethylene Oxide 1040 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
US DOT ERG Protective Action Distance
Name of Hazardous Material
Emergency 
Response 
ID Number
Classification 
(49CFR172.101)
Small Spills Large Spills
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 also describes the general type of hazardous material for each primary 
classification number in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), which is the 
hazardous material classification system used by the railroad industry.14 The emergency 
response numbers in Table 3.3 are matched to a corresponding CFR classification 
number used by the railroads to identify the following types of substances: 
• Class 1 – Explosives 
• Class 2 – Gases 
• Class 3 – Flammable/Combustible Liquids 
• Class 4 – Flammable/Spontaneously Combustible Solids 
• Class 5 – Oxidizers/Organic Peroxides 
• Class 6 – Poisonous/Infectious Materials 
• Class 7 – Radioactive Materials 
• Class 8 – Corrosive Materials 
• Class 9 – Miscellaneous Materials 
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The ERG includes protective action distances (see Table 3.3) that establish the 
downwind limits of exposure when a hazardous material is released into the 
environment.  A protective action zone of a hazardous material release is the square of 
the protective distance, and is considered to be the area in which persons may become 
incapacitated and unable to take protective action and/or incur serious or irreversible 
health effects.  The exposure area defined by this protective action zone for a hazardous 
material release on a rail corridor is illustrated in Figure 3.2.  Protective action distances 
in Table 3.3 are based on the time of day, since less atmospheric mixing occurs at night 
(i.e., less dispersal), and on the size of a spill.  In general, small spills may typically 
involve a release of hazardous material approximately equal to a 55-gallon drum.  
However, for railroad tank cars, which average 16,000-gallon capacity, small spills are 
considered as releasing no greater than five percent of the car’s contents.15 
 
       
Rail Line
 
Figure 3.2  Exposure Area for Hazardous Material 
         Release on Rail Corridor. 
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Figure 3.3 illustrates how the risk factors of track condition, hazardous material carload 
volume, and population (or demographics) can be integrated with the statistical 
information in Table 3.1 to assess the public’s risk of exposure to hazardous materials 
transported by rail through urban areas.  Table 3.2 shows that derailment frequency is a 
function of the number of railcar miles traveled as well as track condition – for a route of 
fixed length, railcar miles increases as the number of carloads shipped over the route 
increases.  In addition, the exposure area illustrated in Figure 3.1 infers that exposure 
risk for an affected area is a function of the numbers of people that happen to be within 
that area (i.e., the population density along the rail corridor). 
 
  
Track
Condition Demographics
Incident
Statistics
Exposure
Risk
Number
of
Carloads
 
                   Figure 3.3  Risk Factors of Rail-Transported 
        Hazardous Materials. 
 
 
 
3.3 Probability of Hazardous Material Release 
The release of hazardous material from a railroad tank car following an accident (i.e., a 
derailment) may be the result of damage to either the tank shell or to appurtenances such 
as loading/unloading fittings.  Barkan et al have found that the release of a hazardous 
material following a railroad tank car accident can be modeled through a regression 
analysis of tank car accident histories as a probability function based on tank car 
thickness.16 Figure 3.4 shows the relationship between tank car thickness (t) and the 
probability of release following an accident (PR/A) plotted over a range of tank 
44 
thicknesses from ½ inch to one inch, which is representative of most North American 
railroad tank cars.  This model indicates that increasing tank thickness beyond 
approximately ¾ inch does not significantly add to tank car safety. 
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                       Figure 3.4  Effect of Tank Thickness on Release Probability. 
 
 
 
The negative exponential model shown in Figure 3.4 is based on accident data that 
reports tank thickness but does not include the speed or force at impact or the track class, 
any of which could be correlated to track condition (i.e., track class).  Moreover, 
statistical distributions on tank car thicknesses that transport hazardous materials in a 
particular urban area are not reported. 
 
Statistics from the FRA’s Office of Safety can be used in lieu of the equation shown in 
Figure 3.4 to predict the probability of release based on track class.  Table 3.4 lists the 
release rates of tank cars that derailed from 1992-2001 according to track class.12 The 
release rates in Table 3.4 are similar in function to Figure 3.3, but allow risk assessments 
to be prepared according to existing or proposed track conditions.  Unlike the probability 
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of release based on tank car thickness, the FRA statistics below show how release rates 
increase as hazardous materials are transported at higher speeds. 
 
 Table 3.4  Hazardous Material Tank Car Release Rates after Derailment, 1992-2001. 
      
FRA Track Class 1 2 3 4 5
Maximum Track Speed (mph) 10 25 40 60 80
Average Speed (mph) 8.7 17.7 26.3 33.6 37.0
Release Rate (%) 2.5 10.5 10.1 12.7 13.1  
 
 
 
The accident statistics presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.4 can be used to predict the 
probability of a hazardous material release (PR) from a railroad tank car according to the 
multiplication law of conditional probabilities.17 Eq. 3.1 shows that when the probability 
of two events, the probability of a derailment (PA) and the probability of a release 
following a derailment (PR/A), are known then (PR) (i.e., the probability that these events 
intersect) can be calculated.  Table 3.5 lists the release probability per billion railroad 
tank car mile traveled for each track class. 
ARAR PPP /×= ................................................................................................. (3.1) 
 
      Table 3.5  Hazardous Material Release Probabilities Based on Track Condition. 
          
FRA Track Class 1 2 3 4 5
Maximum Track Speed (mph) 10 25 40 60 80
PA (derailments/10
9 car-mi) 3979 726 300 77 42
PR/A (releases/derailments) 2.5% 10.5% 10.1% 12.7% 13.1%
PR (releases/10
9 car-mi) 99 76 30 10 6  
 
 
 
Table 3.5 describes the probability of release from railroad tank cars in terms of numbers 
of expected releases per billion car-miles for each track class.  Figure 3.4 plots PR versus 
track class, showing that overall release rates significantly decrease as track class 
increases despite the potential for cars to be subjected to greater impact forces at higher 
maximum track speeds.  This outcome reflects a disproportionately greater reduction in 
46 
total derailments due to higher track quality than that of the corresponding increases in 
hazardous material release rates at higher track speeds.  As a result, the risk of 
transporting hazardous materials on existing rail corridors can be reduced by upgrading 
track rated as Class 1 through Class 3 to either Class 4 or Class 5.  Figure 3.5 shows, 
however, that upgrading a Class 4 track to a Class 5 track would not significantly reduce 
the risk associated with transporting hazardous materials by rail. 
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     Figure 3.5  Relationship of FRA Track Class to Release Probability. 
 
 
 
3.4 Railroad Corridor Exposure Risk 
Railroad tank cars post hazardous material placards for emergency response personnel to 
use in determining the appropriate response action.  However, statistical information on 
the type and frequency that specific chemicals are transported over a particular rail 
corridor is not likely to be available without consent of the railroad company.  As Table 
3.3 shows, the maximum protective action distance for chlorine (4.6 miles) is much 
greater than for coal gas (0.3 miles) even though both are in the same CFR classification 
(gases).  In cases where the numbers of shipments per CFR classification is the only 
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information known, an assessment of exposure risk can be based on a series of statistical 
measures prepared from Appendix C.  For example, Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report protective 
action zones for both small spills and large spills using the minimum, maximum, most 
frequently occurring (i.e., mode), and average protective action distance within each 
CFR classification.  The risk analysis can then be based on a relative risk preference, 
based either on generalized assumptions or on other available information. 
 
Table 3.6  ERG Protective Action Zones for Small Spills. 
   
Minimum Maximum Mode Average Minimum Maximum Mode Average
1 0.04 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.04 0.25 0.25 0.20
2 0.01 13.69 0.01 0.42 0.01 49.00 0.64 2.60
3 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.05 0.04 3.24 0.09 0.38
4 0.01 0.36 0.01 0.04 0.01 4.41 0.01 0.57
5 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.81 0.36 0.26
6 0.01 0.64 0.01 0.09 0.01 4.84 0.01 0.73
7 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
8 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.21 0.01 0.11
9 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Nighttime Exposure Area (sq.mi.)CFR 
Class
Daytime Exposure Area (sq.mi.)
 
 
 
 
 Table 3.7  ERG Protective Action Zones for Large Spills. 
   
Minimum Maximum Mode Average Minimum Maximum Mode Average
1 0.04 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.04 0.25 0.25 0.20
2 0.04 49.00 2.25 6.28 0.09 49.00 49.00 19.88
3 0.25 49.00 0.64 3.38 1.00 49.00 24.01 12.25
4 0.04 31.36 0.04 3.81 0.64 49.00 49.00 15.75
5 0.01 2.89 1.44 1.06 0.16 18.49 12.96 8.16
6 0.01 49.00 49.00 4.85 0.01 49.00 49.00 11.40
7 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41
8 0.04 7.84 0.25 0.53 0.09 42.25 16.00 4.27
9 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
CFR 
Class
Daytime Exposure Area (sq.mi.) Nighttime Exposure Area (sq.mi.)
 
 
 
 
General Assumptions        
Railroad operations are relatively uniform over a 24-hour period, suggesting that there is 
an equal (50 percent) probability of a hazardous material release during the day or night.  
Also, research on tank car accidents indicates that the proportion of large spills and small 
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spills is approximately 22 percent and 78 percent, respectively.18 These assumptions can 
be used to transform the exposure areas in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 to a single representative 
protective action zone, based on proportions of assumed spill size and time of release.   
Eq. 3.2 defines the representative protection action zone in terms of the probability of a 
daytime release (%D) and nighttime release (%N), the probability of a small release (%S) 
and large release (%L), and the respective exposure areas in Tables 3.6 and 3.7. 
( )( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]LNLSNSNLDLSDSD AAAAA //// %%%%%% +++= .................... (3.2) 
 
Table 3.8 lists the exposure areas for each CFR classification using Eq. 3.2, assuming 
uniform railroad operations and typical sizes of spills from tank cars transporting 
hazardous materials.  These results are independent of the actual numbers or types of 
hazardous material shipments that occur on a particular rail corridor and statistical 
measures that have been used to represent the hazardous materials listed in Appendix C. 
 
    Table 3.8  Exposure Area per Hazardous Material Classification. 
     
Minimum Maximum Mode Average
1 0.04 0.25 0.25 0.20
2 0.02 35.25 5.92 4.07
3 0.16 12.30 2.77 1.90
4 0.08 10.75 5.43 2.40
5 0.03 2.70 1.74 1.13
6 0.01 12.98 10.85 2.12
7 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58
8 0.02 6.05 1.81 0.58
9 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
CFR 
Class
Expected Exposure Area (sq.mi.)
 
 
 
         
A representative exposure area can also be calculated based on the proportions of 
hazardous materials per CFR classification shipped on a rail corridor – this necessary 
information is likely to be obtained only with the consent of railroad and governmental 
sources.  Eq. 3.3 converts the exposure areas for each CFR class (Aclass) in Table 3.8 to a 
representative exposure area for a rail corridor (Acor) based on the percentage of 
hazardous material shipments of each CFR class (%class). 
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( )( )classclasscor AA ∑= % ...................................................................................... (3.3) 
The annual exposure risks for each rail corridor can be calculated using Eq. 3.4, based 
on Acor using Eq. 3.3, PR using Table 3.5, the corridor length (Lcor), the population 
density along the corridor (Dpop), and the total number of hazardous material shipments 
during the year (Srail).15   
( )( )( )( )( )Rrailcorrpop PSLDAR expexp = ........................................................................ (3.4) 
 
3.5 Approaches to Exposure Risk Mitigation 
Legislation such as Texas House Bill 160 required an investigation into the feasibility of 
relocating freight trains that carry hazardous materials away from municipalities.  
However, this particular legislation also required the cost of necessary infrastructure to 
be reported so that the economic feasibility of related public policy could be 
understood.9 This section presents two example cases that describe the alternative 
approaches to risk mitigation. Case 1 assumes that all shipments of hazardous materials 
can be relocated to a new bypass.  However, most shipments of hazardous materials 
within municipal areas are a product of railroads providing services to local customers, 
as required by federal law under common carrier obligations.19 Case 2 demonstrates how 
investment in track upgrades on an existing rail corridor can be an economically 
preferred alternative to relocating hazardous material shipments.    
  
Case 1: General Risk Analysis 
Each year 100,000 carloads of hazardous material are shipped within a municipality over 
a single 15-mile rail corridor comprised of Class 2 track.  The exact chemical 
composition of these shipments is not known, though all trains originate from a plant 
that produces flammable and combustible liquids (CFR Class 3).  The average 
population density along the existing corridor is 2,000 people per square mile, while that 
of a proposed 30-mile, $180 million rail bypass is 200 people per square mile.  The 
maximum consequence of this scenario can be examined first by predicting the 
frequency with which a release of hazardous material might occur.  Considering that 1.5 
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million car-miles (100,000 carloads ×15 miles) of hazardous materials are shipped over 
the corridor each year, the release probability of 76 releases per billion car-miles (Table 
3.5) gives a release frequency (T) of: 
 T = (1 yr/1.5 x 106 car-mi)(109 car-mi/76 releases) = 9 years / release 
 
The exposure risk for the Class 2 track can be found using Eq. 3.4 and a maximum 
exposure area for CFR Class 3 hazardous materials (Table 3.8) as follows: 
 Rexp = (12.3 mi2)(2,000 people/mi2)(15 mi)(100,000 cars)(76/109 car-mi) 
         = 2,804 people/year 
 
Assuming that the proposed bypass is constructed to a standard of Class 4 track, the 
release frequency on the new facility would be: 
T = (1 yr/3.0 x 106 car-mi)(109 car-mi/10 releases) = 33 years / release 
 
The exposure risk of the new bypass facility would be: 
Rexp = (12.3 mi2)(200 people/mi2)(30 mi)(100,000 cars)(10/109 car-mi) 
         = 74 people/year 
 
Case 1 shows that the construction of a bypass would significantly reduce exposure to 
the release of a hazardous material on a high-volume rail corridor.  Even though the total 
car-miles increase due to the added length of the new rail corridor, the higher track class 
and lower population density lowers exposure risk.   
 
Case 2: Track Upgrades 
Train speeds within metropolitan areas are generally governed by operational constrains 
of a congested rail network.  The railroads maintain track conditions according to the 
speeds dictated by these constraints, insuring that maintenance programs meet, but do 
not unnecessarily exceed,  49 CFR 213 (Table 3.1).  Thus far, proposed policy has not 
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addressed the economic potential of system-induced limits to operating train speeds as a 
as a component of effective exposure risk mitigation. 
 
Table 3.9 lists the baseline statistics first presented in Table 3.5, but now includes 
scenarios in which track conditions are upgraded to successively increasing track 
classes.  For example, when Class 1 track is upgraded to Class 2 track the derailment 
rate decreases from 3,979 per billion car-miles to 726 per billion car-miles.  When train 
speeds are maintained at the original speed due to system-induced operational limits, the 
probability of a release due to this upgrade decreases from 99 per billion car miles to 18 
per billion car-miles.  Furthermore, as Table 3.9 shows, upgrading Class 1 track to Class 
4 track reduces the derailment rate from 99 per billion car-miles to 8 per billion car-
miles.  Figure 3.6 shows the significant reduction in release probability for the lower 
track classes when track upgrades are implemented.  
 
    Table 3.9  Reduction in Release Probability with Track Upgrade.          
            
Maximum Track Speed (mph) 10 25 40 60 80
Existing FRA Track Class 1 2 3 4 5
PA - Baseline Condition 3979 726 300 77 42
PA - Class 2 minimum 726 726 300 77 42
PA - Class 3 minimum 300 300 300 77 42
PA - Class 4 minimum 77 77 77 77 42
PR/A - constant 2.5% 10.5% 10.1% 12.7% 13.1%
PR - Baseline Condition 99 76 30 10 6
PR - Class 2 minimum* 18 76 30 10 6
PR - Class 3 minimum* 8 32 30 10 6
PR - Class 4 minimum* 2 8 8 10 6  
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 Figure 3.6  Reduction in Release Probability with Track Upgrades. 
 
 
 
If the Class 2 track in Case 1 is upgraded to Class 4 track at a cost of $200,000 per mile, 
while maintaining existing train speeds, the exposure risk becomes: 
Rexp = (12.3 mi2)(2,000 people/mi2)(15 mi)(100,000 cars)(8/109 car-mi) 
         = 295 people/year 
 
The construction of a bypass in Case 1 reduces exposure risk from 2,804 people per year 
to 74 people per year at a cost of $180 million, or a reduction in exposure of 15 people 
per million dollar investment.  Track upgrades in Case 2 reduce exposure from 2,804 
people per year to 295 people per year, or a reduction in exposure of 836 people per 
million dollar investment.  The economics of track upgrades in Case 2 become more 
favorable in light of the fact that the majority of hazardous material shipments cannot be 
relocated to rail bypasses without the bypass alignment being partly constructed in the 
area of higher population density, and without interfering with the railroad’s common 
carrier obligation.       
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3.6 Academic and Industry Observations 
Objective 2 was established to address the Texas Legislature’s desire to assess the 
feasibility of relocating hazardous materials shipped by rail to alternative rail corridors.  
In fact, results that parallel the analysis in this chapter were submitted by the Austin Rail 
Group to the State of Texas recommending track upgrades as a realistic and economic 
alternative to pursuing the public policy considered in House Bill 160.  This risk 
mitigation strategy is currently a component of the state’s initiative to improve rail 
conditions in Houston, Texas as it coordinates with the activities of the Gulf Coast 
Freight Rail District. 
 
This analysis was restricted to the interrelationship between track infrastructure and the 
risk of exposure to hazardous materials.  However, risks beyond those related to 
hazardous material tank car derailments exist, such as the release of hydrochloric acid 
from tank cars exposed to fire following the derailment and ignition of fuel tank cars 
near Baltimore in 2001.20 Relevant issues not discussed in this analysis also include the 
risks inherent in additional handling of hazardous materials at rail yards that would be 
required for rerouting of tank cars.21 Regardless of the extent of analysis, uncertainties 
associated with hazardous material risks require the application of probability and 
statistics.  The principle means by which the Doctor of Engineering program provided 
the appropriate background for risk analyses was through coursework in statistics and 
uncertainty modeling in civil engineering management. 
 
54 
CHAPTER IV 
 
FINANCIAL RISK OF A TIMBER RAILROAD BRIDGE CATASTROPHE 
 
The vast railroad network in Texas is an important part of the state’s transportation 
system.  Over 40 freight railroads operate on approximately 10,386 miles of track, 
providing employment to more than 19,000 residents and a combined income of over 
$1.3 billion annually.22 This rail network not only serves as a major employer, but also 
provides an efficient means of transporting large volumes of bulk and containerized 
freight both within the state itself and between Texas and other states.  In doing so, a 
significant portion of heavy cargo avoids using the highway system and, as a result, 
extends the life of roadway pavements. 
 
The state’s rail network moves close to 10 million carloads of freight annually or about 
400 million tons each year.22  In part, the movement of this amount of freight is made 
possible by several thousand railroad bridges that traverse waterways, roadways, and any 
general change in surface elevation that cannot be accommodated under the constraints 
of track grade design.  Consequently, these railroad bridges represent a critical link to 
the sustained movement of rail freight and are treasured assets to railroad companies. 
 
In most instances, either a natural or manmade railroad bridge catastrophe would bring 
about an instant disruption of service, and would result in financial distress from both the 
loss of the physical asset and from the loss of operating revenue.  The magnitude of 
financial distress due to a bridge loss is directly proportional the size and length of the 
bridge, with the overall impact that this distress imposes upon a corporation dependent 
on the profitability and financial position of the firm.  Ideally, the affected railroad 
would have protection against the impact of a bridge loss through insurance, protection 
further bolstered by the size of the company’s cash reserves and operating revenue.  
However, the sufficiency of these protections is usually only known within a railroad 
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itself and not to transportation agencies that wish to understand the risk of being 
subjected to an increase in roadway truck traffic following the failure of a company.    
 
The uncertainty of financial impact upon a railroad company extends the general notion 
of risk associated with a structural failure beyond that of the condition and loading of 
bridge components, and to the risks that actually threaten the financial viability of the 
rail line.  This second aspect of risk is of particular importance to the transportation 
planning process considering the ramifications of shifting large volumes of freight from 
a bankrupt rail line to the highway system. 
 
This chapter presents a generic model that can be used to understand the relative risks of 
financial distress within railroad companies following the catastrophic loss of a timber 
bridge.  This model provides a means for transportation agencies to comparatively rank 
this susceptibility in the absence of a railroad’s proprietary financial information.  The 
development of this model fulfills Objective 3, which is to: 
Use accounting principles to transform inventories of infrastructure data 
into relative financial risks associated with a corporation’s loss of a 
physical asset. 
 
4.1 Risk Assessment Methodology 
The economic effect of losing a timber railroad bridge due to a disaster such as a fire or 
flood will vary according to the cost of replacing a specific bridge and the revenue that is 
lost during reconstruction.  The unexpected need to replace a bridge corresponds to an 
unexpected expense rather than a capital investment, so the economic analysis is treated 
as a measure of financial burden rather than a determination of return on investment.  
The burden that this unexpected expense has on a railroad will depend on the company’s 
financial position (e.g., cash reserves, insurance coverage, etc.), and the decision to 
rebuild a timber bridge will depend on the potential for the line to continue generating 
net positive value despite the costs incurred.  Considering the impracticality of 
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performing a pro forma analysis of a particular railroad’s finances, this analysis bases 
the economic impact of a bridge loss on the time required for revenues from restored 
service to offset expenses and lost operating income. 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the cash flows expected during construction time (tc) and restored 
operating time (to), assuming that the decision to rebuild the bridge is made immediately 
after its loss.  In this scenario, construction extends from tc = 0 to tc = n, where n equals 
the number of time periods over which bridge replacement occurs.  Operating income 
from restored rail operations extends from to = 0 to to = N, where N equals a number of 
time periods into the future – in this analysis, N equals the number of time periods 
required for the present value of operating income following restored service to equal the 
present value of financial loss associated with reconstruction and suspended operations. 
 
             
Bridge Replacement
Cost
Losses in Operating
Income
Operating Income from Restored
Rail Operations
tc = 0
to = 0
tc = n
to = N
Construction Time (tc) Restored Operating Time (to)  
   
   Figure 4.1  Cash Flow Diagram for Time Sequence of Bridge 
           Reconstruction and Restoration of Rail Operations. 
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By using the time to offset financial loss (N) as a measure of a company’s ability to 
recover from a catastrophic event, an assessment of timber bridges can be prepared that 
identifies locations where an unusually large amount of time is required for a company 
to replace this loss relative to that of other bridges in the statewide inventory. 
 
The present value of cash outflows in a bridge replacement consists of the construction 
cost (C) and the discounted value of lost operating income that occurs over the 
construction period (n) at a discount rate equal to the company’s cost of capital (i).  
Operating income is measured as the revenue remaining after paying operating expenses 
(e.g., salaries, fuel, equipment, etc.).  A company’s operating margin (M) represents the 
percentage of revenues (R) remaining after deducting these operating expenses,23 which 
means that the operating income lost during a bridge replacement is the product of 
operating margin (M) and total revenues (R).  The present value of financial loss (i.e., the 
cost) can found using Eq. 4.1. 
( )
( ) 


+
−++= n
n
cost ii
iMRCPV
1
11 .......................................................................... (4.1) 
Eq. 4.1 incorporates revenue and operating margin as parameters since revenue 
generated by a particular rail line should be easier to estimate (e.g., from shipping 
charges, carload volumes, etc.) than estimating a company’s operating income directly.  
Similarly, the present value of cash inflows from restored rail operations also uses these 
parameters as the basis for determining operating income (MR) following restored rail 
operations.  In this analysis, operating income is realized over an unknown number of 
periods (N) until the financial loss (PVcost) is offset by cash inflows (PVrev) equal to: 
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The time required to replace the financial loss incurred by a catastrophic event is 
determined by computing the time required for PVrev to equal PVcost, which is found by 
using Eqs. 4.1 and 4.2 to solve for N as follows: 
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revcost PVPV = .................................................................................................. (4.3) 
Substituting Eq. 4.1 and Eq. 4.2 into Eq. 3 gives: 
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Eq. 4.4 can be expressed as: 
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Or, more conveniently: 
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Eq. 4.6 can be solved for the number of periods required to replace lost revenue by using 
the natural log identity, ln(xk) = k ln(x), as follows: 
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Since ln(x) is undefined at values of x less than or equal to zero, there is a limiting cost-
to-revenue ratio (C/R) for which N exists.  The limiting condition for which N is defined 
in Eq. 4.7 is: 
( ) 0112 >+
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And the limiting cost-to-revenue ratio is: 
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Eq. 4.9 indicates that the cost-to-revenue ratio reaches a maximum at n = 0, or: 
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M
R
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For example, if a railroad company’s operating margin is 16.0 percent, its cost of capital 
is 6.5 percent, and rail traffic could be temporarily diverted to another line at no 
additional cost (i.e., n = 0), then the present value of future operating income would, 
over a period of time, equal the present value of the bridge reconstruction cost as long as 
C/R < 2.46.  On the other hand, there would never be enough time for the present value 
of cash inflows from restored operations to equal the bridge reconstruction cost if the 
cost-to-revenue ratio approaches 2.46.  This limitation is due to the diminishing 
contribution that the cash inflow from each subsequent year adds to net present value.  
The impact that discounting annual cash inflows in this example have on net present 
value are shown in Figure 4.2 (i.e., plotting the present value factor for a uniform series 
of cash flows). 
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    Figure 4.2  Diminishing Effect of Revenues in Additional Time Periods. 
 
 
 
Though the true impact of a bridge catastrophe on a railroad company cannot be simply 
measured by the number of time periods required for operating income to replace the 
financial loss, this approach approximates the extent of burden that a catastrophe would 
place on a company’s financial position.  Corporate executives will most likely have 
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considered the time required to replace their financial loss when pricing the value of 
insurance or, on low-revenue rail lines, when determining if continued operations on the 
line would be financially possible. 
  
4.2 Incorporation of Industry Data 
Timber railroad bridge spans are based on an approximate 15-foot design length,24 
whereas concrete replacement bridges are typically constructed using a single concrete 
span to replace two timber spans due to the greater strength and constructability that 
prestressed concrete beams offer over that of timber stringers.  In general, new concrete 
spans in a replacement bridge can be assumed to require approximately 10 days to 
construct at a cost of $6,000 per foot ($180,000 per new 30-foot span).  Construction of 
a new bridge may also require two days of mobilization once the decision to replace the 
original bridge has been made. 
 
The Surface Transportation Board issued a decision on January 17, 2008, to estimate a 
company or industry cost of equity using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).25 
Based on this guidance, a typical cost of capital (i) in Texas is assumed to be 
approximately 6.68 percent (see Chapter V for calculation of Union Pacific Railroad cost 
of capital).  Information on operating margins (M) can be obtained from the income 
statements of publicly traded railroad companies, which are reported to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and made available through online financial data services.26 
 
Figure 4.3 outlines the basic components of an income statement for the purpose of 
distinguishing between revenue, operating income, and net income.23  In this sample 
statement, the operating margin equals 25 percent since operating income (MR) is 25 
percent of the $100 million in operating revenue (R), or $25 million.  Taxable income of 
$24.5 million is obtained by deducting an assumed $0.5 million interest expense from 
operating income.  At an assumed tax rate of 34 percent, taxes on the taxable income 
equal $8.3 and net income equals taxable income less taxes, or $16.2 million. 
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($ million)
Operating Revenue (R ) 100.0
Operating Expenses 75.0
Operating Income (MR ) 25.0
Interest Paid 0.5
Income before Taxes 24.5
Taxes 8.3
Net Income 16.2
 
    Figure 4.3  Sample Income Statement. 
 
 
 
Revenue statistics for publicly traded railroad companies are available from filings with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and from online financial data services, 
whereas revenue statistics for private companies are not typically released to the public. 
Whether a rail line is publicly or privately owned, the financial performance of any 
specific line is considered to be proprietary information.  Consequently, estimates of 
revenues for rail lines listed in a statewide inventory must be based on sources that 
compile industry data for release to the public. 
 
Industry data is often published according to railroad classification, as published under 
49 CFR Part 1201.27 Table 4.1 lists the criteria by which railroads are classified as of 
March 2009.  Class I railroads are defined as those with revenue of at least $250 million, 
whereas regional railroads have revenues between $20 million and less than $250 
million, and operate lines of at least 350 miles in length.  Shortlines earn less than $20 
million in annual revenue and operate lines less than 350 miles long, while switching 
and terminal railroads are classified according their function rather than according to a 
revenue threshold.      
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         Table 4.1  Classification Guidelines for U.S. Railroads, 2009. 
       
Type                
of                   
Railroad
Revenue       
Range         
(million)
Line 
Distance 
(miles)
U.S.       
Total
Class I $250+ - 7
Regional $20+    350+ 33
Shortline <$20 <350 323
Switching & Terminal - - 196  
 
 
         
Table 4.2 lists national revenue statistics compiled by the Association of American 
Railroads (AAR) according to railroad classification (i.e., Class I, Regional, Shortline, or 
Switching & Terminal) for 2008.28 Considering that revenue statistics compiled by AAR 
and the financial disclosures of public railroad companies both report revenues on a 
national basis rather than by state or per line, operating revenue (R) earned on a 
particular rail line is not likely to be readily available.  Table 4.2 also shows the percent 
of U.S. track within Texas for each track classification 
 
            Table 4.2  National Railroad Revenue Statistics and State Estimates, 2005. 
     
STB Railroad 
Classification U.S.Track Miles
Total Revenue  
($ billion)
State of Texas 
Track Miles
Percent of U.S. 
Track Miles in 
Texas
Class I 94,801 50.3 8,270 8.72%
Regional 16,713 1.7 382 2.29%
Shortline 21,960 1.2 803 3.66%
Switching & Terminal 6,455 0.8 931 14.42%  
 
 
 
The information in Table 4.2 cannot be correlated to revenue per mile of track within the 
state since captive shippers (i.e., companies served by only one railroad) often generate 
greater revenue per carload for the railroads than companies that benefit from 
competitive pricing.  For example, a principle justification for the Union Pacific 
Railroad in acquiring Southern Pacific Railroad assets in 1996 was the Southern 
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Pacific’s position as the lone provider of rail service to the plastics and chemical 
industries in the Bayport Industrial District near Houston, Texas.  This arrangement led 
to the formation of a limited partnership (San Jacinto Rail Limited) between BNSF 
Railway and local chemical companies to pursue the construction of a competing 13 
mile, $80 million track build-in from an existing BNSF mainline.29 As an alternative to 
relying on proprietary line revenues, the financial risk of a bridge catastrophe can be 
examined by scenario analysis or simulation.    
 
The sample income statement presented in Figure 4.3 reflects an operating margin of 25 
percent, based on operating revenue of $100 million and expenses of $75 million.  
Actual operating margins from the 2007 annual reports of public railroad companies are 
listed in Table 4.3, which shows no apparent trend in the size of margin with respect to 
the type of railroad.  For example, the average operating margin for Class I railroads in 
2007 was 25.05 percent, while that for Pioneer Rail, which operates a number of 
shortline railroads, was 20.73 percent.  The operating margin from Pioneer Rail’s 
shortline operations in 2007 was much higher than the 12.11 percent margin produced 
by RailAmerica’s regional and shortline operations. 
 
        Table 4.3  Operating Margins for Selected Public Railroad Companies, 2007. 
                   
Railroad Type
Operating 
Margin     
(%)
BNSF Railway Class I 22.47
Union Pacific Railroad Class I 20.73
CSX Transportation Class I 22.49
Norfolk Southern Class I 27.41
Canadian National Class I 36.42
Kansas City Southern Class I 20.40
Florida East Coast Railway Regional 19.70
Genesse & Wyoming Regional & Shortlines 18.76
RailAmerica Regional & Shortlines 12.11
Pioneer Rail Shortlines 20.73  
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Rail line revenues and operating margins should be used to predict a railroad company’s 
susceptibility to the loss of a timber bridge with an understanding of industry dynamics 
and prevailing market conditions.  Operating revenues earned at the time of a bridge loss 
may or may not be representative of revenues expected to be generated in the future, just 
as operating margins are periodically subject to non-recurring expenses.  The effects of 
these issues are captured in the variability of operating margins over the last eight years 
in Figure 4.4. 
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                      Figure 4.4  Eight-Year History of Railroad Operating Margins. 
 
 
 
Plots of operating margins from annual reports between 2000 and 2007 in Figure 4.4 
show how the average operating margin for Class I railroads increased from 13.86 
percent in 2000 to 25.05 percent in 2007.  This figure also contrasts the operating 
performance of the Class I railroads listed in Table 4.3 to that of the Florida East Coast 
Railway and Genesee & Wyoming, Inc. over the same eight-year period.  These plots 
show how reliance only on 2007 data to assume that the Florida East Coast Railway’s 
operating margin is always lower than those of Class I railroads would be incorrect.  In 
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fact, Florida East Coast Railway’s operating margin outperformed the average operating 
margin for Class I railroads by an average of 41 percent between 2000 and 2007. 
 
From the financial information available for Genesee & Wyoming, Inc., the company 
would appear to maintain an operating margin of about 18.60 percent if it were not for a 
large non-recurring expense in 2006.  A comparison of Florida East Coast and Genesee 
& Wyoming in Figure 4.4 shows that these regional railroads’ operating margins may be 
quite different in some years but nearly the same a few years later.  Consequently, 
distinctions between the operating efficiency of Class I, regional, and shortline railroads 
from a financial standpoint cannot necessarily be made, nor can the representative nature 
of data in a single year be assumed.       
 
4.3 Trend Analysis 
Considering the dynamics of revenues and operating margins described above, trends in 
loss replacement period (N) are plotted in Figures 4.5 through 4.7 to evaluate the extent 
of expected variation.  These plots incorporate the industry parameters outlined above 
into Eq. 4.7 as follows: 
• Cost of capital (i) = 6.68% 
• Construction cost (C) = $180,000 per concrete replacement span 
• Expected duration of bridge replacement (n) = 10 days per concrete 
replacement span, plus two days for mobilization 
 
Figures 4.5 through 4.7 plot N at four levels of operating revenue (R), ranging from 
$250,000 to $10 million per year, against numbers of timber spans lost in a catastrophic 
event.  A comparison of these plots shows that the replacement period begins to 
approach infinity (i.e., reach the limit defined in Equation 4.9) more quickly at lower 
revenues and operating margins.  These plots show that at low operating margins and 
revenues, the loss of only a few timber spans would require such a lengthy loss 
replacement period that continuing to operate an uninsured line might be unjustifiable.  
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In fact, railroad companies operating at low margins and revenues might be the least 
capable of affording property insurance that would lessen the impact of a catastrophic 
event and allow the line to continue serving its customers. 
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            Figure 4.5  Loss Replacement Periods at a 25 Percent Operating Margin. 
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            Figure 4.6  Loss Replacement Periods at a 15 Percent Operating Margin.                     
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           Figure 4.7  Loss Replacement Periods at a 7.5 Percent Operating Margin. 
 
 
 
Figures 4.5 through 4.7 show that as line revenue approaches several million dollars, a 
railroad’s loss replacement period grows very modestly as the number of timber spans 
lost in a catastrophe increases.  In contrast to the sensitivity that revenues of $1 million 
or less have to numbers of spans lost and operating margins, the consistent horizontal 
trends at revenue of $10 million in each plot indicate that lines generating at least $10 
million can be categorized as having low financial risk when supported by bridges of 
only moderate lengths.  For example, a 36-span timber bridge on a line generating at 
least $10 million in revenue with an operating margin of 25 percent would have a loss 
replacement period of 24 months, whereas an 18-span bridge (i.e., one-half as long) on a 
line generating $1 million in revenue at the same operating margin would have a 
replacement period of 113 months. 
 
The results in the form presented in Figures 4.5 through 4.7 can be transformed into an 
alternative trend analysis that shows the replacement period as a function of line revenue 
for specific numbers of spans.   For example, Figure 4.8 summarizes the relationship for 
timber bridges consisting of up to eight spans assuming an operating margin of 20 
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percent and a nominal cost of capital equal to 6.68 percent.    The trends in Figure 4.8 
reflect points of exponential growth in the replacement period at low operating revenues, 
and reach these points earlier as the number of spans increase.  For example, the 
replacement period for a two-span bridge begins to exhibit infinite growth at an 
operating revenue equal to about $0.5 million, whereas this same trend for an eight-span 
bridge begins at about $1.5 million. 
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                       Figure 4.8  General Analysis of Loss Replacement Period.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 also shows that the replacement periods for bridges of modest length stabilize 
as operating revenues approach $10 million, reflecting the fact that financial risk is 
comparatively small for rail lines comprised of only a few spans and that generate 
several million dollars in operating revenue. 
 
4.4 Application of Methodology 
Financial performance indicators such as revenues, costs of capital, and operating 
margins are normally treated as annual values, so the most convenient use of Eq. 4.7 is 
69 
to base input parameters on annual values and then convert the output parameter N from 
an annual value to an equivalent number of days or months.  Four hypothetical cases of 
bridge losses are analyzed in the next section using a cost of capital of 6.68 percent and 
an operating margin of 18.7 percent. 
 
Table 4.4 contains results from the analysis methodology using four hypothetical cases 
of bridge losses (Bridges A, B, C, and D) that vary in the numbers of original timber 
spans and annual revenues generated by their respective rail lines.  Bridge A is a six-
span bridge on a high-volume line that generates $200 million in revenue per year.  
Based on the expected cost and duration of bridge replacement, the total present value of 
expenses plus lost revenue would be $3.93 million, requiring 37 days of restored 
operations to offset this cost – this may not be a particularly realistic case since a 
catastrophe on a high-revenue line would be counteracted by a remedial measure such as 
rerouting if possible (see Bridge D).   
 
Bridge B is on a relatively low volume line consisting of only two spans.  The two 
original timber spans are expected to be replaced by a single concrete span within 12 
days at a cost of $180,000.  Even though the time and cost of reconstructing this bridge 
is much less than Bridge A, the time required for revenues from restored operations to 
offset the total cost is more than twice as long due to its low revenue generating 
potential. 
 
Bridge C is on a rail line that generates the same annual revenue as the line containing 
Bridge B but consists of 10 timber spans.  Without access to alternative routes or the 
financial capacity to accelerate construction, the low revenue from this line would 
require a full year of restored operations to offset the losses incurred by a catastrophe.  A 
railroad with limited earnings potential such as this might be incapable of devoting a 
fiscal year to replacing costs, and could be forced out of business.   
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Bridge D is on a line that generates a large amount of revenue and consists of 10 timber 
spans.  This line is owned by a company having access to other routes and, therefore, 
experiences no time out of service.  Even though the replacement cost of this bridge is 
$900,000, only 23 days are required to offset this expense since revenue continues to be 
generated during reconstruction. 
 
         Table 4.4  Relative Risk Analysis of Example Timber Bridge Replacements. 
 
Bridge No. of Timber Spans
Line        
Revenue (R )   
($/year)
Construction 
Cost (C )     
($)
Time Out of 
Service (n ) 
(days)
Total Cost 
NPV        
($)
Cost Offset 
Time (N )     
(days)
A 6 200,000,000 540,000 32 3,925,084 37
B 2 4,500,000 180,000 12 208,612 88
C 10 4,500,000 900,000 52 1,023,548 450
D 10 75,000,000 900,000 0 900,000 23       
 
 
 
The hypothetical cases in Table 4.4 illustrate how a statewide inventory of timber 
bridges can be used to identify lines that might discontinue service in the event of a 
catastrophic timber bridge loss.  Rather than attempting to predict the severity that a 
bridge loss has on the particular financial position of a railroad, the analysis 
methodology provides a means of comparing the time required for operating income 
from restored rail operations on a specific line to offset the financial loss relative to that 
of bridges on all other lines.  Locations requiring the largest amounts of time for 
operating income to replace the financial loss (e.g., Bridge C in Table 4) should be 
considered as bridges having the greatest risk of not being reconstructed.  The state can 
use pavement analysis models that predict the long-term cost of adding trucks to a 
particular roadway in the event that rail service is lost, then use this added public cost as 
a guideline in deciding whether to finance part or all of the railroad bridge replacement.  
 
4.5 Academic and Industry Observations 
Objective 3 was established to address concerns by the Texas Department of 
Transportation that the loss of a timber railroad bridge would place additional truck 
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traffic on public roadways and add to the state’s pavement maintenance cost as a result.  
Advanced knowledge of the rail network’s susceptibility to a bridge catastrophe can 
assist public agencies in developing strategies to determine those instances where public 
financing of private infrastructure is warranted.  Therefore, the analysis methodology 
presented in this chapter contributes to the transportation planning process by outlining 
factors that can contribute to the loss of a railroad bridge and by examining the issues 
that affect a firm’s ability to recover from this type of catastrophe.   
 
Considering the variability in response time of actual bridge losses, the circumstances 
that influence a railroad company’s ability to resume operations following the loss of a 
timber bridge requires further investigation.  Two timber railroad bridges lost to fire in 
February 2009, a 312-foot CSX bridge near Mobile, Alabama and a similar Great 
Western bridge near Greeley, Colorado, have had dramatically different effects on the 
shippers that these lines serve.  In the first instance, CSX worked with other railroads to 
continue providing service to Mobile until a new bridge had been built 12 days later.30 In 
contrast, the Great Western bridge fire resulted in a complete loss of service and an 
indefinite time of bridge replacement.31 The principle means by which the Doctor of 
Engineering program provided the appropriate background for this financial risk analysis 
was through coursework in accounting, financial management, and construction 
engineering.  Additional work related to the uncertainties and assumptions presented 
herein should incorporate probability and statistics to quantify the risks inherent in 
timber bridge assets.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
USE OF FINANCIAL MARKET DATA IN RAILROAD NEGOTIATIONS 
 
One of the railroad industry’s primary financial parameters involved in negotiations and 
disputes before the STB is the corporate cost of capital.  A railroad’s cost of capital 
serves as the basis for determining revenue adequacy, resolving disputes on rates and 
trackage rights, and in reviewing merger applications.  With such economic value at 
stake, the means of calculating a railroad’s cost of capital itself can be quite contentious.  
Calculations yielding a higher cost of capital lead to revenues being discounted at a 
higher rate, which is of benefit to the railroad industry by lowering the present value of 
revenues claimed to be earned on a rail line.  Lower line revenue can sway the STB to 
permit the abandonment of a branch line or increase rail shipping rates.  On the other 
hand, calculations that yield a lower cost of capital can be used to support a shipper’s 
(i.e., a railroad customer’s) claim that rail shipping rates should be lower. 
 
The cost of capital is comprised of both debt and equity components.  The cost of debt 
represents a company’s cost of borrowing, the rate at which is generally not widely 
disputed since these rates are, at least in part, observable through the interest rates they 
offer on corporate bonds. The cost of equity represents the return that shareholders 
require on their investment in a company.23 Given that shares of corporate stock are 
openly traded in the marketplace (e.g. the New York Stock Exchange), there can be 
considerable disagreement on a company’s true cost of equity.  Whereas bonds are 
essentially contracts between a company and bondholders, shareholders constantly 
revise their expectations for returns as they weigh the opportunity cost of investing in 
one company versus another.    
 
With important decisions at state in the railroad industry, and in light of the difficulty in 
identifying shareholder expectations, the STB devotes careful attention to the 
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methodology used to calculate cost of equity.  Since 1981, the cost of equity has been 
based on a single-stage Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model shown in Eq. 5.1.25 
g
P
DRe += ...................................................................................................... (5.1) 
The STB has used this model to estimate return on equity (Re) by adding the ratio of 
dividend (D) to share price (P) to a forecasted growth rate (g) based on an average of 
security analyst’s 5-year forecast in the growth of a company’s earnings per share.  
Disputes over this method have centered on the use of dividend payments in the absence 
of additional performance measures, and a reliance on a single growth rate that is 
assumed to remain constant in perpetuity.  In January 2008, the STB ruled that costs of 
capital in the railroad industry must follow the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
which is thought to more fully conform to current finance practice and more accurately 
capture the market’s expectations for equity holdings.25 
 
The CAPM method of calculating cost of capital relies more on market returns from 
railroad stock rather than stock price and the size of dividends.  This chapter 
demonstrates the use of the CAPM in engineering analyses that require the integration of 
design and economics as they pertain to the private sector.  An example design scenario 
is used to fulfill Objective 4, which is to:    
Apply methodologies used in financial markets to the development of 
parameters required to perform engineering economic analyses. 
 
5.1 Calculating Cost of Capital 
The CAPM shown as Eq. 5.2 calculates return on equity as the sum of a risk-free interest 
rate (Rf) obtainable from U.S. Treasuries of suitable maturity and a risk premium (Rp).23 
This risk premium represents the additional interest that shareholders expect as 
compensation for investing in stocks rather than government-backed notes. 
pfe RRR β+= ................................................................................................ (5.2) 
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Since the risk premium is measured as the difference between historic market returns 
(Rm) and the risk-free rate, the CAPM can also be expressed as Eq. 5.3.  In both Eq. 5.2 
and 5.3, a risk beta factor (β) is used to adjust the market risk to fit the risk profile of a 
particular company or industry.  Stocks that perform in unison with the market have a 
beta close to one, while stocks of greater volatility and lower volatility have betas greater 
than one and less than one, respectively. 
)( fmfe RRRR −+= β .................................................................................... (5.3)  
According to electronic data sources such as Bloomberg Market Data, interest rates on 
10-year treasuries (i.e., risk free notes) have averaged approximately 4.25 percent.  
Historic returns on corporate stock from 1928 to 2007 (Figure 5.1) have averaged 11.69 
percent.32 
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     Figure 5.1  Historic Returns on the U.S. Stock Market. 
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Cost of Equity 
Based on the STB’s guidelines for determining returns on risk-free treasuries and stock 
market investments, the market risk premium on equity is: 
( ) ( ) %44.725.469.11 =−=−= fmp RRR  
 
The market risk premium is adjusted to fit the risk profile of a railroad by factoring the 
market risk premium by the company’s equity beta.  This equity beta is calculated as the 
covariance between the returns on a company’s stock and the returns on the market, 
divided by the variance of market returns.23 For example, the equity beta of Union 
Pacific Corporation is calculated as the covariance between returns on Union Pacific 
stock and returns on the S&P 500 market index (σUP-S&P) divided by the variance of 
returns on the S&P 500 market index (σ2S&P), shown in Eq. 5.4. 
 
PS
PSUP
&
2
&
σ
σβ −= .................................................................................................. (5.4) 
The STB ruling stipulates that beta calculations must be based on five-year, weekly 
industry data.  By calculating the percent change in weekly share prices of Union Pacific 
and the S&P 500 over the last 260 weeks (5 years), a covariance of returns (R) on these 
stocks can be determined using Eq. 5.5. 
  
1
1 &
__
& −


 

 −

 −
=
∑
=
− n
RRRR
n
i PS
i
UP
i
PSUPσ ..................................................... (5.5) 
A company’s equity beta can also be determined by measuring the relationship between 
returns on a stock and the market through linear regression, as shown in Figure 5.2.23 In 
the case of Union Pacific, a plot of weekly returns on Union Pacific stock versus returns 
on the S&P 500 yields a slope, which is equal to the equity beta, of 0.9749.  Based on 
Eq. 5.2, the preceding results yields a cost of equity for Union Pacific equal to: 
( ) ( ) %50.1144.79749.025.4 =+=+= pfe RRR β  
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          Figure 5.2  Correlation of Union Pacific Stock Returns to 
         Market Performance. 
 
 
 
Cost of Capital 
In addition to the cost of equity, a railroad’s cost of capital is also determined by the cost 
of debt (Rd).  The cost of equity and cost of debt are used to find a weighted average cost 
of capital (WACC), based on the percent debt financing (kd), percent equity financing 
(ke), and the company’s statutory tax rate (T), as shown in Eq. 5.6.23  
( ) eedd RkRTkWACC +−= 1 ........................................................................... (5.6) 
Reports filed by Union Pacific with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
show that the company was financed in 2007 with approximately 30 percent debt and 70 
percent equity, and taxed at a corporate rate of 37.8 percent.26 Bloomberg Market Data 
indicates that the annual yield on 10-year investment grade corporate bonds has 
averaged 5.61 percent, which if used with Union Pacific’s cost of equity yields a WACC 
equal to: 
 WACC = (0.303)(1-0.378)(0.0561) + (0.697)(11.50) = 9.08% 
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The calculation of Union Pacific’s cost of capital uses market rates that are intrinsically 
adjusted for inflation.  The need to adjust annual cash flows for inflation in engineering 
analyses can be eliminated by reducing the WACC by the expected inflation rate.  An 
inflation rate of 2.40 percent yields a cost of capital in real terms of 6.68 percent for 
Union Pacific.34 Table 5.1 includes the equity beta and resulting cost of capital for other 
Class I railroads, showing that different costs of debt and equity, as well as different 
amounts of leveraged financing, will yield different costs of capital. 
 
         Table 5.1  Class I Discount Rate Parameters. 
 
Class I 
Railroad Equity Beta
Debt        
(%)
Equity       
(%)
Cost of Equity 
(%)
Cost of 
Capital      
(%)
Discount     
Rate        
(%)
CSX 1.23 42.70 57.30 13.30 9.28 6.88
KCS 1.50 50.40 49.60 15.19 9.50 7.10
NS 1.27 39.60 60.40 13.58 9.75 7.35
UP 0.99 33.00 67.00 11.62 9.07 6.67   
   
 
                                         
Table 5.2 contrasts each railroad’s costs of capital (Table 5.1) to the return on 
investment for each company reported by the STB.  In 2007 the STB determined that 
Norfolk Southern was the only Class I railroad having adequate revenue (i.e., return on 
investment is greater than the cost of capital), which is supported by the results for Class 
I railroads shown in Table 5.2.  
 
                        Table 5.2  Revenue Adequacy of Class I Railroads, 2007. 
      
Class I 
Railroad
Cost of 
Capital      
(%)
Return on 
Investment   
(%)
Return - Cost 
(%)
CSX 9.28 7.61 -1.67
KCS 9.50 9.37 -0.13
NS 9.75 13.55 3.80
UP 9.07 8.90 -0.17  
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5.2 Applying Cost of Capital to Negotiations 
In a hypothetical scenario, a department of transportation (DOT) is considering design 
options for a new bridge having a proposed alignment within rail yard property 
belonging to the Terminal Railroad & Switching Company (TRSC).  Bridge design 
strategies included the need to construct either five piers or eight piers at the rail yard, 
and a baseline price must be established for the DOT to offer TRSC as compensation. 
      
The existing track configuration at the rail yard (Figure 5.3) currently consists of eight 
storage tracks with combined storage capacity of approximately 30,234 feet.  TRSC 
bases revenue on a switching fee of $102 per rail car and a turnover of switched rail cars 
at the rail yard three times per day.  Switching yards are not likely to operate at 100 
percent of theoretical capacity, and instead operate at a capacity equal to approximately 
70 percent of total track.  Assuming operations at 70 percent of capacity, TRSC is 
expected to currently generate about $36.4 million annually. 
 
    
                 Figure 5.3  Existing Track Configuration at Terminal 
 Railroad Switching Company Rail Yard. 
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Loss of revenue in any single year correlates to TRSC’s inability to increase track 
storage capacity in that year due to the existence of bridge piers.  The TRSC has 
determined that ultimate track storage capacity without bridge piers will be 270,470 total 
feet and that ultimate track storage capacity with five and eight I-70 bridge piers would 
be reduced to 259,167 total feet and 239,380 total feet, respectively.  The TRSC should 
begin to lose revenue in the year that growth in switching service warrants expansion of 
track storage capacity beyond either 259,167 total feet in the case of five piers, or 
239,380 total feet in the case of eight piers, but is prohibited from doing so due to the 
spatial constraints posed by the particular pier configuration.  The calculation of 
economic loss over a specified project life is based on: 
• Project life (duration) 
• TRSA cost of capital 
• Estimate of annual growth in switching business 
• Time to ultimate capacity (with and without piers) 
 
The DOT and TRSC have agreed to base the price of compensation on a 100-year 
project life and a cost of capital equal to 5.0 percent.  Table 5.3 shows the probability 
distribution of near-term growth in switch rail traffic used by the FRA to assist public 
agencies with the allocation of resources for the resolution of grade crossing problems.4 
These statistics reflect a normal distribution with a mean annual growth of 2.95 percent, 
which can be used to predict the near-term annual growth in revenue for TRSC. 
 
Table 5.4 shows the FRA’s probability distribution for long-term growth in switch rail 
traffic, which reflects a distribution skewed to the left having a mean annual growth of 
2.00 percent and a 90th percentile annual growth of 2.50 percent.  These statistics can be 
used to predict the long-term annual growth in revenue for TRSC. 
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     Table 5.3  Near-Term Growth in Switch Rail Traffic. 
             
Percentile Percent Annual Growth
1% 2.3147
5% 2.5008
10% 2.6000
20% 2.7201
30% 2.8068
40% 2.8808
50% 2.9500
60% 3.0192
70% 3.0932
80% 3.1799
90% 3.3000
95% 3.3992
99% 3.5853  
 
 
 
    Table 5.4  Long-Term Growth in Switch Rail Traffic. 
             
Percentile Percent Annual Growth
1% 0.5527
5% 1.0578
10% 1.3000
20% 1.5668
30% 1.7415
40% 1.8796
50% 2.0000
60% 2.1125
70% 2.2248
80% 2.3465
90% 2.5000
95% 2.6149
99% 2.8063  
 
The statistical information presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 suggest that a fair assessment 
of economic loss to TRSC over 100 years might be to negotiate around a 2.50 percent to 
3.0 percent annual growth according to the following levels of uncertainty: 
• 2.00 percent/year (50 percent chance of understating long-term growth) 
• 2.50 percent/year (10 percent chance of understating long-term growth) 
• 3.00 percent/year (virtually no chance of understating long-term growth 
and 50 percent chance of understating near-term growth) 
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Annual cash flows from switching operations consist of a period of growth that 
continues until ultimate yard storage capacity is reached, followed by a period of 
constant cash flows throughout the remainder of the project life.  The time for switching 
business at the TRSC rail yard to reach capacity (t) is a function of the existing 30,234-ft 
storage capacity (Cexisting), the track capacity at build-out (Cbuildout), and the assumed 
growth in switching service (g), as shown in Eq. 5.7. 
( )
( )g
CC
t existingbuildout+= 1ln
/ln ....................................................................................... (5.7) 
Therefore, the times required to reach yard capacity at assumed annual rates of growth in 
switch rail traffic (i.e., 2.00, 2.50, and 3.00 percent) are listed in Table 5.5, which shows 
that growth in switching operations would not be constrained throughout the 100-year 
period of analysis at a growth rate of 2.00 percent.  Growth rates of 2.50 and 3.00 
percent shorten the time to ultimate yard capacity to less than 100 years, with the 
existence of bridge piers causing this time to shorten further by four to five years.  
Therefore, the economic consequences of constructing bridge piers are: 
• No effect if the annual growth rate is 2.00 percent 
• Shortening of the time to build-out by: 
− Five years at annual growth rate of 2.50 percent 
− Four years at annual growth rate of 3.00 percent 
 
 Table 5.5  Time to Capacity at TRSC Rail Yard. 
       
No Piers 5 Piers 8 Piers
2.00 110.7 108.5 104.5
2.50 88.8 87.0 83.8
3.00 74.2 72.7 70.0
Time to Yard Capacity (yrs)Growth   
(%/yr)
 
 
 
   
Net Present Value Analysis 
Determination of net present value (NPV) as a baseline price of compensation to TRSC 
is comprised of revenues earned during a business growth period (Table 5.5) and 
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revenues earned while TRSC operates at full build-out.  The NPV during the growth 
period (NPVg) incorporates TRSC’s cost of capital (iCOC) with an assumed growth rate 
(g) and the base year revenue (R0), which equals $36.4 million, using Eq. 5.8.35 
( )
( ) 
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0 ................................................................................. (5.8) 
The convenience rate (iCR) shown in Eq. 5.8 is calculated using Eq. 5.9.35 
1
1
1 −+
+=
g
i
i COCCR ............................................................................................... (5.9) 
The annual revenue at full build-out (Rcap) can be calculated using Eq. 5.10. 
( )tcap gRR += 10 .............................................................................................. (5.10) 
The NPV of revenues that accrue during full build-out (NPVc) can be calculated using 
the time of operation at build-out (n), or 100 – t, using Eq. 5.11. 
( )
( ) ( )
t
COCn
COCCOC
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c iii
iNPV −+
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−+= 1
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11 ............................................................... (5.11) 
 
The net present value of cash flows over 100 years discounted at TRSC’s cost of capital 
equals the sum of NPVg and NPVc.  Table 5.6 lists the NPV for 5-pier and 8-pier bridge 
design strategies in addition to the case of no piers at the TRSC rail yard.  Three 
scenarios have been investigated using the three annual rates of growth in switch rail 
traffic listed in Table 5.5 (i.e., 2.00, 2.50, and 3.00 percent) and base year revenue of 
$36.4 million. 
 
         Table 5.6  Net Present Value of TRSC Revenue (100 Years). 
               
No Piers 5 Piers 8 Piers
2.0 1,168,323,488 1,168,323,488 1,168,323,488
2.5 1,351,577,090 1,349,766,823 1,345,816,052
3.0 1,548,140,176 1,542,313,070 1,530,948,955
Growth   
(%/yr)
Net Present Value ($)
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Table 5.7 lists the NPV of the differences in each bridge design strategy.  According to 
the results at 2.50 percent growth (only 10 percent chance of being understated), the 
economic loss to TRSC by the 5-pier strategy is $1.81 million and the economic loss for 
the 8-pier strategy is $5.76 million.  Consequently, the additional loss incurred by TRSC 
by accommodating eight piers instead of only five piers would be $3.95 million 
(assuming that revenues grow at 2.50 percent). 
  
Table 5.7  Effects of Bridge Pier Design Strategies on TRSC Revenue. 
         
No Piers - 5 Piers No Piers - 8 Piers 5 Piers - 8 Piers
2.0 0 0 0
2.5 1,810,267 5,761,038 3,950,771
3.0 5,827,106 17,191,221 11,364,115
Growth   
(%/yr)
Net Present Value ($)
 
        
 
 
5.3 Academic and Industry Observations 
Objective 4 was established to demonstrate how the analysis of financial market data can 
be integrated into engineering analyses that involve the private sector.  In the case of 
projects affecting the railroad industry, market data can be used to determine a 
company’s cost of capital by applying the methodology stipulated by the STB.  This 
approach provides results that are supported by STB rulings that the railroads are 
subjected to on a regular basis, and can be used in engineering consulting practice in 
negotiations involving railroad infrastructure.  The principle means by which the Doctor 
of Engineering program provided the appropriate background for these cost of capital 
determinations was through coursework in financial management, financial investment 
analysis, and statistics.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Summary 
This chapter summarizes the accomplishments of the Doctor of Engineering internship 
and provides conclusions on the outcome of each objective. 
 
Objective 1 
A new method of analyzing the impact highway-railroad grade crossing conflicts was 
developed that relies on the queuing theory adopted by the FRA, while providing a more 
efficient and accurate means integrating train characteristic information into the 
analyses.  The method developed as part of Objective 1 is capable of using the results 
from rail network simulations of regional analyses that may consist of hundreds of grade 
crossings. As a result, this method significantly reduces the time required to perform 
economic assessments of proposed infrastructure projects such as regional rail bypass 
corridors. 
 
Objective 2 
A proposed public policy to relocate hazardous materials transported by rail through 
municipalities to new rail corridors was evaluated from both a risk-based and economic 
perspective.  Research relevant to the analysis of exposure risk was identified and 
applied to inventories of hazardous material shipments and railroad track conditions, and 
superimposed on demographic data to quantify the effects of an actual release of 
hazardous material in urban areas.  The analysis methodology was then applied to two 
risk mitigation strategies to evaluate the economic feasibility of each, resulting in a 
recommended alternative to the existing public policy proposal. 
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Objective 3 
The traditional engineering perspective on risk associated with timber railroad bridges 
was extended to include the potential for the owner of the asset to experience financial 
distress.  Accounting concepts were applied to general bridge replacement costs and 
construction schedules to develop basic equations that predict the number of revenue 
periods required to offset expenses and lost operating income.  The relationship between 
rail line revenue, operating margin, and bridge length was then summarized in graphical 
form to describe the interrelationship between these financial and physical parameters.  
The findings from Objective 3 were applied to timber bridge inventories using scenario 
analyses of line revenues to assess the relative risks associated with railroads and, as a 
result, predict instances where the loss of a bridge would likely lead to abandonment of 
the rail line. 
 
Objective 4 
Methods used to assess the performance of public companies in financial markets were 
applied to the calculation of discount rates necessary in engineering analyses.  Recent 
direction by the Surface Transportation Board on calculating costs of equity for the 
railroad industry were used to demonstrate the integration of financial market data into 
feasibility assessments and valuations involving the private sector.  The application of 
discount rates based on cost of capital was demonstrated using a hypothetical bridge 
design scenario requiring the valuation of economic loss to a railroad that results from 
right-of-way acquisition. 
 
6.2 Conclusions 
The following conclusions are derived from the Doctor of Engineering internship: 
 
Grade Crossing Analyses 
The current methodology used to determine economic costs of highway-railroad 
interactions at grade crossings has been improved while maintaining the transportation 
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engineering relationships of queue theory adopted by the FRA.  Extension of the FRA 
equations has provided a means of including unlimited, discrete train types generated by 
computer-simulated rail network studies for the analysis of infrastructure investments 
having a regional impact on mobility. 
 
Hazardous Materials Public Policy 
Track upgrades within municipal areas provide a viable alternative to relocating 
hazardous materials transported by rail onto new rail bypasses.  In most instances, 
constraints to public funding and common carrier obligations of the railroads are likely 
to make track upgrades a more cost effective risk mitigation strategy than current public 
policies proposed to relocate trains carrying hazardous materials. 
 
Timber Bridge Risks 
The financial risks associated with a timber bridge catastrophe can be expressed relative 
to the physical characteristics of the bridge and the financial performance of the bridge 
owner.  Specific factors that contribute to financial distress by the loss of any particular 
bridge, such as response time or marginal revenue, have not been identified in this 
analysis. 
 
Financial Market Analysis 
Sufficient information exists from financial data services to integrate market-based 
determinations of cost of capital into economic assessments of engineering projects.  The 
application of Surface Transportation Board directives to calculate discount rates for 
private railroad companies provides a sound basis for negotiations on public projects that 
affect railroad revenues. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
ADT      = average daily traffic, veh/day 
ACBT = average crossing block time, min 
Aclass = exposure area per hazardous material classification, mi2 
α = roadway coefficient, veh-hrs/min2 
β = roadway coefficient, veh-hrs/min (Chapter II) 
β = equity beta, dimensionless (Chapter V) 
B = vehicle queue buildup 
C = project cost, dollars 
Cbuildout = rail yard storage capacity at full build-out, ft 
Cexisting = existing rail yard storage capacity, ft 
D = cumulative dispersed vehicles (Chapter II) 
D = stock dividend payment (Chapter V) 
Dpop = population density, people/mi2 
CBT = crossing block time, min 
g = growth rate, percent 
i = discount rate, percent 
iCOC = cost of capital, percent 
iCR = convenience rate, percent 
k = vehicle queue density, veh/lane-ft 
kd = percent debt financing 
ke = percent equity financing 
Lcorr = corridor length, mi  
Ltr = train length, ft 
λ = vehicle arrival rate, veh/lane-sec 
µ = vehicle departure rate, veh/lane-sec 
M = operating margin, percent 
N = number of time periods 
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n = time period or number of time periods 
nf = number of freight trains 
np = number of passenger trains 
ns = number of switch trains 
NK = number of affected vehicles at grade crossing closure 
NPV = net present value, dollars 
P = stock share price, dollars 
PR = probability of hazardous material release, percent 
R = revenue, dollars 
Rcap = revenue at full rail yard build-out, dollars 
Rd = cost of debt, percent 
Re = cost of equity, percent 
Rexp = risk of exposure, people/yr 
Rf = risk-free rate of return, percent 
Rm = historic market rate of return, percent 
Rp = risk premium, percent 
R0 = revenue at existing rail yard capacity, dollars 
Srail = number of carload shipments per rail corridor 
Str = train speed, mph 
σ = covariance, unit-squared 
T = hazardous material release frequency, yrs (Chapter III) 
T = statutory tax rate, percent (Chapter V) 
tc = time period of construction initiation 
to = time period of restored rail operations 
tq = time-in-queue, veh-hrs 
t = thickness, in (Chapter III) 
t = time (Chapter IV and V) 
v = free flow vehicle speed, mph 
WACC = weighted average cost of capital, percent 
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w = delay time, veh-hrs 
wT = total delay time, veh-hrs 
z = vehicle growth rate at back of queue, veh/sec 
%D = probability of daytime release, percent 
%L = probability of large release, percent 
%N = probability of nighttime release, percent 
%S = probability of small release, percent 
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APPENDIX A 
 
INTERNSHIP SUPERVISOR FINAL REPORT 
 
The Doctor of Engineering internship consisted of 12 consecutive months of 
employment at the Austin, Texas office of HNTB Corporation, comprised of 
engineering, financial, and economic analyses within the Austin Rail Group. During this 
time Craig prepared feasibility studies, computer models, risk analyses, market 
assessments and financial valuations on behalf of public and private sector clients related 
to infrastructure investment and development. 
 
In fulfilling Objective 1 of the internship, which was to demonstrate the transformation 
of previous research into mathematical approaches and computer tools for use on HNTB 
projects, Craig initiated this process by researching the current mathematical models 
used in the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) GradeDec model and the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Mobile6 model.   
 
Finding shortcomings in each of these approaches, Craig set for the approach to 
incorporate actual railroad train performance measurement that were the result of 
running Berkeley Simulation’s Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) model, and then 
established the defensible methodology for calculating reductions in emissions and 
vehicular delays associated with railroad/roadway at-grade crossings.  Concurrently, this 
approach incorporated a realistic value associated with the reduction of at-grade crossing 
accidents.   
 
This analysis essentially produced an accurate measurement of public burden reductions, 
and railroad operational improvement measurements, to quantify both pubic and private 
benefits associated with railroad infrastructure improvements, in conjunction with 
applicable grade separation and crossing closures proposals, for an entire rail corridor as 
opposed to the previous standard comprised of one single location. 
 
In fulfillment of this objective, the end product is one which dramatically reduced the 
level of effort and time required to obtain economic value results, while expanding the 
services HNTB Corporation could provide its clients maintaining the company’s long-
standing credibility in the public and private sector. 
 
Objective 2 involved the selection of appropriate engineering literature for application 
toward the assessment of policy proposed to reduce the public’s exposure to hazardous 
materials. 
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The 80th Texas Legislative Session enacted House Bill 160 to quantify the costs 
associated with relocating hazardous material movements shipped by freight rail from 
within urbanized areas with a population density of more than 1.2 billion people.  
Concurrently, HB160 required the determination of enhancements to public safety 
associated with this potential relocation. 
 
In completing this objective, Craig identified an approach suited to the information 
available within the scope of HB160, and then constructed a mathematical model 
capable of integrating large amounts of information pertaining to demographics, 
hazardous material shipments, and recommended emergency response actions. 
 
Through this analysis it was determined that the costs associated with relocating railroad 
corridors outside of urbanized areas dramatically exceeded the perceived benefit 
outlined in HB160.  This determination led Craig to establish an alternative model that 
described the public benefit associated with existing railroad infrastructure 
improvements and a revised railroad operating policy for the movement of hazardous 
materials. 
 
The results of this objective, both in its initial form as well as the recommended 
alternative, were subsequently submitted to the Texas Legislature for review. 
 
Objective 3 encompassed the establishment of a risk assessment associated with the 
catastrophic loss of infrastructure.  On March 1, 2007, the northern-most timber bridge 
approach to the international rail bridge crossing in Presidio, Texas was succumb to fire, 
completely eliminating any freight rail goods movement between the United States and 
Mexico at this location.  The nearest rail points-of-entry for rerouting rail traffic were 
now El Paso and Eagle Pass, however the rail line operators at these locations differed 
from those at Presidio, requiring the negotiation of new operating agreements, and the 
determination of cost increases for goods shipped due to the increase in route-miles 
traveled.  
 
The loss-of-use of the Presidio bridge prompted the State of Texas to analyze a similar 
type of loss of critical infrastructure for marginally profitable rail line owners, such as 
shortline or regional railroads, that transport critical commodities such as coal to energy 
generating plants within the state. Using standard accounting measures and scenario-
based revenues to predict the susceptibility of rail line owners to financial distress, 
Craig’s research determined the locations within the State of Texas where rail line access 
to energy plants where not redundant.  Obtaining financial information from shortline 
rail carriers, Craig then prepared a loss-of-revenue analysis to determine the timeframe 
required to offset the costs associated with replacing lost infrastructure. 
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Although the analysis was used to determine costs applicable to replacement of timber 
rail structures, the methodology Craig established can be employed, which minor 
revision, to the loss of track infrastructure as well. 
 
Assisting the State with the understanding of contributing factors that could essentially 
terminate rail service, and the associated costs to prevent such termination, enables the 
State to incorporate fact-based decision making when determining whether to contribute 
financially, in the form of grants or loans, to a private industry thus maintaining the 
movement of critical goods throughout the state – for the betterment of the State’s 
residents. 
 
The skills required to meet Objective 4, which encompassed the application of financial 
market data to engineering economic analyses, were regularly used in work involving 
the quantification of economic impacts on the railroad industry.   
 
Quite frequently State governmental entities, such as Departments of Transportation, 
impact private industry, such as railroads, when preparing roadway network expansion 
projects.  Rarely does the State agency have a thorough understanding of the private 
industry’s business model, and need to maintain its infrastructure, while conversely the 
private industry does not fully understand the associated undertakings of the State 
agency.  Consequently, negotiations between the two entities for property acquisition, 
regardless of initiating party, begin at opposite ends of the spectrum, historically taking 
years to reach agreement during which time the immediate needs for enhancements may 
have waned or intensified. 
 
In one such case, jointly the Missouri and Illinois Departments of Transportation entered 
into negotiations with the Terminal Railroad Company of St. Louis (TRRA) in an 
attempt to acquire railroad right-of-way to construct a new Interstate 70 bridge spanning 
the Mississippi River.  At issue was the loss of future capacity at a TRRA switching yard 
resulting from the placement of new bridge piers. 
 
Craig researched the railroad industry’s cost of capital and historic growth rates 
associated with terminal railroads and switching yards, then established mathematical 
models that predicted full capacity at a rail yard as it exists today, and when the rail yard 
would be required to expand to meet the demands of capacity growth. 
 
The multitude of scenarios Craig prepared enabled the Departments of Transportation to 
negotiate with the TRRA, having defensible facts, which narrowed the ‘financial’ gap 
between the entities, and brought resolution in months, not years. The economic 
valuations prepared for this analysis can be re-created for similar situations nationwide. 
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Craig has successfully completed all the aforementioned objectives in a manner that the 
models established as well as the engineering, financial, and economic analyses 
undertaken, while satisfying the initial intent of the project at-hand, have provided value 
to HNTB Corporation for subsequent projects in the future. 
 
Therefore, without hesitation, I validate that the work product for Craig’s Doctor of 
Engineering Internship has been successfully completed. 
 
Joseph A. Lileikis 
 
AVP – HNTB Corporation 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SAMPLE GRADE CROSSING ANALYSIS COMPUTER CODE 
 
Import Parameters  Description 
n = read input   number of analysis periods 
adt = read input  average daily traffic at a grade crossing 
k = read input   queue density 
µ = read input   departure rate 
v = read input   free flow vehicle speed 
nacbt = read input  total of train blockage times 
nacbtsq = read input  total of train blockage times squared 
pcex = read input  passenger car equivalent factor 
r = read input   vehicle growth rate 
g = read input   train growth rate 
i = read input   public discount rate 
nlane = read input  number of total vehicle lanes 
q = read input   queue cost 
d = read input   delay cost 
 
Initialize Variables   Description 
rx = 0    vehicle growth factor 
gx = 0    train growth factor 
px = 0    public discount factor 
t = 0    time period 
tq = 0    queue time 
td = 0    delay time 
ecost = 0   cost of vehicle emissions 
vcost = 0   cost of VOC consumption 
dcost = 0   cost of delay time 
total = 0   total cost 
 
Calculate Costs 
If (n + 1) > t: 
t = t + 1 
rx = (1 + r)t 
pce = (adt)(pcex)(rx) 
( )( )86400nlane
PCE=λ  
λ
λ
−= vk
vkz  
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gx = (1 + g)t 
nacbt = (nacbt)(gx) 
nacbtsq = (nacbtsq)(gx) 
tq = tq +(αq)(nacbtsq) + (βq)(nacbt) 
td = td + (αd)(nacbtsq) + (βd)(nacbt) 
px = (1 + i)t 
ecost = (ecost + (tq)(qe))/(px) 
vcost = (vcost + (tq)(qv))/(px) 
dcost = (dcost + (td)(d))/(px) 
Else: 
total = ecost + vcost + dcost 
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APPENDIX C 
 
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AND PROTECTIVE ACTION DISTANCES 
 
    
Day      
(mi)
Night     
(mi)
Day      
(mi)
Night     
(mi)
Ammonia, anhydrous 1005 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.4
Boron trifloride 1008 2.3 0.1 0.4 1.1 3.0
Carbon monoxide 1016 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.5
Chlorine 1017 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.6
Coal gas 1023 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Cyanogen 1026 2.3 0.2 0.8 0.7 2.7
Ethylene Oxide 1040 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
Fluorine 1045 2.3 0.1 0.3 0.5 2.2
Hydrogen bromide, anhydrous 1048 2.3 0.1 0.3 1.1 3.6
Hydrogen chlorine, anhydrous 1050 2.3 0.1 0.3 2.2 6.5
Hydrogen cyanide 1051 6.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 2.3
Hydrogen fluoride 1052 8 0.1 0.3 1.2 2.7
Hydrogen sulfide 1053 2.3 0.1 0.2 1.3 3.9
Methyl bromide 1062 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.4
Methyl mercaptan 1064 2.3 0.1 0.2 0.8 2.8
Dinitrogen tetroxide 1067 2.3 0.1 0.3 1.0 2.5
Nitrosyl chloride 1069 2.3 0.1 0.6 2.7 6.9
Oil gas 1071 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Diphosgene 1076 2.3 0.6 2.6 4.1 7.0
Phosgene 1076 2.3 0.6 2.6 4.1 7.0
Sulfur dioxide 1079 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.3 3.9
Trifluorochloroethylene 1082 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5
Acrolein 1092 6.1 0.3 1.1 3.0 6.3
Allyl alcohol 1098 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4
Ethylene chlorohydrin 1135 6.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0
Crotonaldehyde 1143 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5
Dimethyldichlorosilane 1162 3 0.2 0.7 1.9 4.9
Dimethylhydrazine 1163 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.8
Ethyl chloroformate 1182 6.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 1.1
Ethyleneimine 1185 6.1 0.2 0.5 1.2 2.5
Ethyltrichlorosilane 1196 3 0.2 0.7 1.9 4.9
Methyl chloroformate 1238 6.1 0.2 0.5 1.1 2.4
Methyl chloromethyl ether 1239 6.1 0.2 0.6 1.6 3.5
Methyldichlorosilane 1242 4.3 0.1 0.4 1.0 3.0
Methylhydrazine 1244 6.1 0.2 0.3 0.9 1.8
Methyltrichlorosilane 1250 3 0.1 0.3 0.8 2.5
Methyl vinyl ketone 1251 6.1 0.8 2.1 7.0 7.0
Nickel carbonyl 1259 6.1 0.5 2.2 2.9 6.1
Trichlorosilane 1295 4.3 0.1 0.6 1.6 4.1
Trimethylchlorosilane 1298 3 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.7
Vinyltrichlorosilane 1305 3 0.1 0.5 1.1 3.1
Phosphorus pentasulfide 1340 4.3 0.1 0.4 0.6 2.4
Calcium phosphide 1360 4.3 0.3 1.3 3.9 7.0
Pentaborane 1380 4.2 0.6 2.1 3.3 6.9
Sodium dithionite 1384 4.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8
Aluminum phosphide 1397 4.3 0.4 1.7 5.6 7.0
Lthium amide 1412 4.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 1.0
Magnesium aluminum phoshide 1419 4.3 0.4 1.6 4.9 7.0
Sodium phosphide 1432 4.3 0.2 1.1 2.9 7.0
Tetranitromethane 1510 5.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 1.0
Acetone cyanohydrin 1541 6.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.9
Methyldichloroarsine 1556 6.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 2.2
Arsenic chloride 1560 6.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.1
Bromoacetone 1569 6.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 1.5
Chloropicrin 1580 6.1 0.3 0.5 1.2 2.2
Chloropicrin methyl bromide 1581 2.3 0.1 0.4 1.3 3.7
Chloropicrin methyl chloride 1582 2.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.1
Chloropicrin 1583 6.1 0.3 0.5 1.2 2.2
Cyanogen chloride 1589 2.3 0.4 1.8 2.7 6.3
Dymethyl sulfate 1595 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5
Ethylene dibromide 1605 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4
Hexaethyl tetraphosphate 1612 2.3 0.5 1.7 2.2 5.1
Hydrocyanic acid 1613 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8
Hydrogen cyanide, anhydrous 1614 6.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 1.1
Ethylene dibromide methyl bromide 1647 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4
US DOT ERG Protective Action Distance
Name of Hazardous Material
Emergency 
Response 
ID Number
Classification 
(49CFR172.101)
Small Spills Large Spills
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Day      
(mi)
Night     
(mi)
Day      
(mi)
Night     
(mi)
Nitric oxide 1660 2.3 0.1 0.5 0.4 1.7
Perchloromethyl mercaptan 1670 6.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8
Potassium cyanide 1680 6.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 2.4
Sodium cyanide 1689 6.1 0.1 0.4 0.8 3.0
Chloroacetone 1695 6.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.9
Acetyl bromide 1716 8 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.4
Acetyl chloride 1717 3 0.1 0.3 0.7 2.2
Allyl chlorocarbonate 1722 6.1 0.2 0.5 1.2 2.4
Allyltrichlorosilane 1724 8 0.1 0.5 1.2 3.4
Aluminum bromide, anhydrous 1725 8 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.6
Aluminum chloride, anhydrous 1726 8 0.1 0.5 0.7 2.8
Amyltrichlorosilane 1728 8 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.2
Antimony pentafluoride 1732 8 0.1 0.6 1.2 3.4
Boron trichloride 1741 2.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.1
Bromine 1744 8 0.3 1.1 2.1 4.6
Bromine pentafluoride (land) 1745 5.1 0.2 0.9 1.7 4.3
Bromine pentafluoride (water) 1745 5.1 0.1 0.6 1.4 4.1
Bromine trifluoride (land) 1746 5.1 0.1 0.4 1.1 3.0
Bromine trifluoride (water) 1746 5.1 0.1 0.6 1.2 3.6
Butyltrichlorosilane 1747 8 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.3
Chlorine trifluorde 1749 2.3 0.3 1.3 1.8 5.1
Chloroacetyl chloride (land) 1752 6.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.6
Chloroacetyl chloride (water) 1752 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.0
Chlorosulfonic acid (land) 1754 8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Chlorosulfonic acid (water) 1754 8 0.1 0.4 0.5 1.7
Chlorosulfonic acid sulfur trioxide (land) 1754 8 0.2 0.6 1.5 4.0
Chlorosulfonic acid sulfur trioxide (water) 1754 8 0.1 0.4 0.5 1.7
Sulfur trioxide chlorosulfonic acid (land) 1754 8 0.2 0.6 1.5 4.0
Sulfur trioxide chlorosulfonic acid (water) 1754 8 0.1 0.4 0.5 1.7
Chromium oxychloride 1758 8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8
Cyclohexyltrichlorosilane 1763 8 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.9
Dichlorophenyltrichlorosilane 1766 8 0.1 0.6 1.3 3.6
Diethyldichlorosilane 1767 8 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8
Diphenyldichlorosilane 1769 8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8
Dodecyltrichlorosilane 1771 8 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.2
Fluorosulfonic acid 1777 8 0.1 0.3 0.6 2.1
Hexyltrichlorosilane 1784 8 0.1 0.3 0.7 2.4
Nonyltrichlorosilane 1799 8 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.6
Octadecyltrichlorosilane 1800 8 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.8
Octyltrichlorosilane 1801 8 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.6
Phenyltrichlorosilane 1804 8 0.1 0.6 1.4 4.0
Phosphorus pentachloride 1806 8 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.9
Phosphorus trichloride (land) 1809 6.1 0.1 0.3 1.0 2.2
Phosphorus trichloride (water) 1809 6.1 0.1 0.4 1.0 3.0
Phosphorus oxychloride (land) 1810 8 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.4
Phosphorus oxychloride (water) 1810 8 0.1 0.6 1.5 3.9
Propyltrichlorosilane 1816 8 0.1 0.3 0.8 2.6
Silicon tetrachloride 1818 8 0.1 0.4 1.0 2.9
Sulfur chlorides (land) 1828 8 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.1
Sulfur chlorides (water) 1828 8 0.1 0.4 0.9 3.0
Sulphur chlorides (land) 1828 8 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.1
Sulphur chlorides (water) 1828 8 0.1 0.4 0.9 3.0
Sulfur trioxide 1829 8 0.2 0.6 1.5 4.0
Sulfuric acid, fuming 1831 8 0.2 0.6 1.5 4.0
Sulfuryl chloride (land) 1834 8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5
Sulfuryl chloride (water) 1834 8 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.8
Sulphuryl chloride (land) 1834 8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5
Sulphuryl chloride (water) 1834 8 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.8
Thionyl chloride (land) 1836 8 0.2 0.5 0.6 1.4
Thionyl chloride (water) 1836 8 0.2 1.1 2.8 6.5
Titanium tetrachloride (land) 1838 8 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5
Titanium tetrachloride (water) 1838 8 0.1 0.3 0.7 2.3
Silicon tetrafluoride 1859 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5
Ethyldichloroarsine 1892 6.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7
Acetyl iodide 1898 8 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.1
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Diborane 1911 2.3 0.2 1.0 1.1 3.4
Calcium dithionite 1923 4.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8
Zinc dithionite 1931 9 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8
Compressed gas, flammable, poisonous, nos (hazard zone A) 1953 2.1 0.8 3.2 5.4 7.0
Compressed gas, flammable, poisonous, nos (hazard zone B) 1953 2.1 0.2 0.8 2.5 6.7
Compressed gas, flammable, poisonous, nos (hazard zone C) 1953 2.1 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.0
Compressed gas, flammable, poisonous, nos (hazard zone D) 1953 2.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
Compressed gas, flammable, toxic, nos (hazard zone A) 1953 2.1 0.8 3.2 5.4 7.0
Compressed gas, flammable, toxic, nos (hazard zone B) 1953 2.1 0.2 0.8 2.5 6.7
Compressed gas, flammable, toxic, nos (hazard zone C) 1953 2.1 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.0
Compressed gas, flammable, toxic, nos (hazard zone D) 1953 2.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
Compressed gas, poisonous, flammable, nos (hazard zone A) 1953 2.1 0.8 3.2 5.4 7.0
Compressed gas, poisonous, flammable, nos (hazard zone B) 1953 2.1 0.2 0.8 2.5 6.7
Compressed gas, poisonous, flammable, nos (hazard zone C) 1953 2.1 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.0
Compressed gas, poisonous, flammable, nos (hazard zone D) 1953 2.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
Compressed gas, toxic, flammable, nos (hazard zone A) 1953 2.1 0.8 3.2 5.4 7.0
Compressed gas, toxic, flammable, nos (hazard zone B) 1953 2.1 0.2 0.8 2.5 6.7
Compressed gas, toxic, flammable, nos (hazard zone C) 1953 2.1 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.0
Compressed gas, toxic, flammable, nos (hazard zone D) 1953 2.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
Liquified gas, flammable, poisonous, nos (hazard zone A) 1953 2.1 0.8 3.2 5.4 7.0
Liquified gas, flammable, poisonous, nos (hazard zone B) 1953 2.1 0.2 0.8 2.5 6.7
Liquified gas, flammable, poisonous, nos (hazard zone C) 1953 2.1 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.0
Liquified gas, flammable, poisonous, nos (hazard zone D) 1953 2.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
Liquified gas, flammable, toxic, nos (hazard zone A) 1953 2.1 0.8 3.2 5.4 7.0
Liquified gas, flammable, toxic, nos (hazard zone B) 1953 2.1 0.2 0.8 2.5 6.7
Liquified gas, flammable, toxic, nos (hazard zone C) 1953 2.1 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.0
Liquified gas, flammable, toxic, nos (hazard zone D) 1953 2.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
Compressed gas, poisonous, nos (hazard zone A) 1955 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Compressed gas, poisonous, nos (hazard zone B) 1955 2.3 0.3 1.3 4.9 7.0
Compressed gas, poisonous, nos (hazard zone C) 1955 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Compressed gas, poisonous, nos (hazard zone D) 1955 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.8 2.4
Compressed gas, toxic, nos (hazard zone A) 1955 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Compressed gas, toxic, nos (hazard zone B) 1955 2.3 0.3 1.3 4.9 7.0
Compressed gas, toxic, nos (hazard zone C) 1955 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Compressed gas, toxic, nos (hazard zone D) 1955 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.8 2.4
Liquified gas, poisonous, nos (hazard zone A) 1955 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, nos (hazard zone B) 1955 2.3 0.3 1.3 4.9 7.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, nos (hazard zone C) 1955 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, nos (hazard zone D) 1955 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.8 2.4
Liquified gas, toxic, nos (hazard zone A) 1955 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Liquified gas, toxic, nos (hazard zone B) 1955 2.3 0.3 1.3 4.9 7.0
Liquified gas, toxic, nos (hazard zone C) 1955 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Liquified gas, toxic, nos (hazard zone D) 1955 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.8 2.4
Organic phosphate mixed with compressed gas 1955 2.3 0.7 2.1 2.7 6.0
Insecticide gas, poisonous or toxic 1967 2.3 0.7 2.1 2.7 6.0
Dinitrogen tetroxide and nitric oxide mixture 1975 2.3 0.1 0.5 0.4 1.7
Iron pentacarbonyl 1994 6.1 0.2 0.4 1.0 1.9
Magnesium diamide 2004 4.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.8
Magnesium phosphide 2011 4.3 0.4 1.5 4.7 7.0
Potassium phosphide 2012 4.3 0.3 1.1 2.9 7.0
Strontium phosphide 2013 4.3 0.2 1.1 2.9 7.0
Nitric acid, fuming 2032 8 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8
Hydrogen chloride, refrigerated liquid 2186 2.3 0.1 0.3 2.2 6.5
Arsine 2188 2.3 0.4 1.9 2.6 5.9
Dichlorosilane 2189 2.3 0.1 0.6 2.5 6.7
Oxygen difluoride 2190 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Sulfuryl fluoride 2191 2.3 0.1 0.2 0.8 2.4
Germane 2192 2.3 0.1 0.6 0.5 1.9
Selenium hexafluoride 2194 2.3 0.5 2.0 2.7 5.6
Tellurium hexafluoride 2195 2.3 0.6 2.5 3.7 7.0
Tungsten hexafluoride 2196 2.3 0.1 0.7 0.6 2.3
Hydrogen iodide, anhydrous 2197 2.3 0.1 0.2 0.8 2.3
Phosphorus pentafluoride 2198 2.3 0.2 1.0 1.0 2.9
Phosphine 2199 2.3 0.4 1.9 2.7 6.0
Hydrogenselenide, anhydrous 2202 2.3 0.8 3.2 5.4 7.0
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Carbonyl sulfide 2204 2.3 0.1 0.4 1.9 5.0
Chloroacetaldehyde 2232 6.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0
Allylamine 2334 6.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.5
Phenyl mercaptan 2237 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4
Dimethylhydrazine 2282 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.8
Isopropyl chloroformate 2407 6.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.9
Carbonyl fluoride 2417 2.3 0.1 0.7 0.6 2.3
Sulfur tetrafluoride 2418 2.3 0.4 2.0 2.9 6.6
Hexafluoroacetone 2420 2.3 0.2 0.8 4.5 7.0
Nitrogen trioxide 2421 2.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 1.2
Methylphenylchlorosilane 2437 8 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7
Trimethylacetyl chloride 2438 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5
Trichloroacetyl chloride 2442 8 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.4
Thiophosgene 2474 6.1 0.5 1.5 2.3 4.2
Methyl isothiocyanate 2477 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7
Methyl isocyanate 2480 6.1 0.3 1.2 3.3 7.0
Ethyl isocyanate 2481 3 0.4 1.3 3.9 7.0
n-Propyl isocyanate 2482 6.1 0.7 1.6 5.6 7.0
isopropyl isocyanate 2483 3 0.7 1.8 7.0 7.0
tert-Butyl isocyanate 2484 6.1 0.6 1.5 5.2 7.0
n-Butyl isocyanate 2485 6.1 0.5 1.0 2.9 5.0
Isobutyl isocyanate 2486 3 0.5 1.0 3.0 4.8
Phenyl isocyanate 2487 6.1 0.2 0.3 1.0 1.8
Cyclohexyl isocyanate 2488 6.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.0
Iodine pentafluoride 2495 5.1 0.1 0.6 1.2 3.6
Diketene 2521 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Methylchlorosilane 2534 2.3 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.0
Chlorine pentafluoride 2548 2.3 0.2 1.1 1.5 4.6
Carbon monoxide and hydrogen mixture 2600 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.5
Methoxymethyl isocyanate 2605 3 0.2 0.4 1.0 1.6
Methyl orthosilicate 2606 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4
Methyl iodide 2644 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5
Hexachlorocyclopentadiene 2646 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3
Chloroacetonitrile 2668 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Stibine 2676 2.3 0.3 1.4 1.7 4.7
Phosphorus pentabromide 2691 8 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.7
Boron tribromide (land) 2692 8 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.8
Boron tribromide (water) 2692 8 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.6
n-Propyl chloroformate 2740 6.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.9
sec-Butyl chloroformate 2742 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4
Isobutyl chloroformate 2742 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
n-Butyl chloroformate 2743 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Lithium nitride 2806 4.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.6
Poisonous liquid, nos (hazard zone A) 2810 6.1 0.8 2.2 7.0 7.0
Poisonous liquid, nos (hazard zone B) 2810 6.1 0.3 1.1 2.1 4.6
Poisonous liquid, organic, nos (hazard zone A) 2810 6.1 0.8 2.1 7.0 7.0
Poisonous liquid, organic, nos (hazard zone B) 2810 6.1 0.2 0.6 1.6 3.5
Toxic liquid, nos (hazard zone A) 2810 6.1 0.8 2.2 7.0 7.0
Toxic liquid, nos (hazard zone B) 2810 6.1 0.3 1.1 2.1 4.6
Toxic liquid, organic, nos (hazard zone A) 2810 6.1 0.8 2.1 7.0 7.0
Toxic liquid, organic, nos (hazard zone B) 2810 6.1 0.2 0.6 1.6 3.5
Ethyl chlorothioformate 2826 8 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6
Ethyl phosphonous dichloride, anhydrous 2845 6.1 0.2 0.5 1.2 2.2
Methyl phosphonous dichloride 2845 6.1 0.3 0.8 1.9 3.7
Bromine chloride 2901 2.3 0.2 0.6 1.5 3.9
Ethyl phosphonothioic dichloride, anhydrous 2927 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Ethyl phosphorodichloridate 2927 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Poisonous liquid, corrosive, nos (hazard zone A) 2927 6.1 0.5 1.5 3.9 7.0
Poisonous liquid, corrosive, nos (hazard zone B) 2927 6.1 0.3 1.1 2.1 4.6
Toxic liquid, corrosive, organic, nos (hazard zone A) 2927 6.1 0.4 1.3 3.9 7.0
Toxic liquid, corrosive, organic, nos (hazard zone B) 2927 6.1 0.2 0.4 1.0 1.8
Poisonous liquid, flammable, nos (hazard zone A) 2929 6.1 0.8 2.2 7.0 7.0
Poisonous liquid, flammable, nos (hazard zone B) 2929 6.1 0.2 0.6 1.6 3.5
Poisonous liquid, flammable, organic, nos (hazard zone A) 2929 6.1 0.8 2.1 7.0 7.0
Poisonous liquid, flammable, organic, nos (hazard zone B) 2929 6.1 0.2 0.6 1.6 3.5
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Toxic liquid, flammable, nos (hazard zone A) 2929 6.1 0.8 2.2 7.0 7.0
Toxic liquid, flammable, nos (hazard zone B) 2929 6.1 0.2 0.6 1.6 3.5
Toxic liquid, flammable, organic, nos (hazard zone A) 2929 6.1 0.8 2.1 7.0 7.0
Toxic liquid, flammable, organic, nos (hazard zone B) 2929 6.1 0.2 0.6 1.6 3.5
Radioactive material, uranium hexafluoride, fissle 2977 7 0.1 0.4 0.5 2.1
Radioactive material, uranium hexafluoride 2978 7 0.1 0.4 0.5 2.1
Chlorosilanes, flammable, corrosive, nos 2985 3 0.1 0.3 0.8 2.4
Chlorosilanes, corrosive, flammable, nos 2986 3 0.1 0.3 0.8 2.4
Chlorosilanes, corrosive, nos 2987 8 0.1 0.3 0.8 2.4
Chlorosilanes, nos 2988 4.3 0.1 0.3 0.8 2.4
2-Methyl-2-heptanethiol 3023 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5
Aluminum phosphide pesticide 3048 6.1 0.4 1.7 5.6 7.0
Metal alkyl halides 3049 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8
Aluminum alkyl halides 3052 4.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8
Trifluoroacetyl chloride 3057 2.3 0.2 0.8 4.9 7.0
Methacrylonitrile 3079 3 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0
Perchloryl fluoride 3083 2.3 0.1 0.4 2.2 5.5
Poisonous liquid, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone A) 3122 6.1 0.8 2.2 7.0 7.0
Poisonous liquid, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone B) 3122 6.1 0.2 0.9 1.7 4.3
Toxic liquid, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone A) 3122 6.1 0.8 2.2 7.0 7.0
Toxic liquid, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone B) 3122 6.1 0.2 0.9 1.7 4.3
Poisonous liquid, water-reactive, nos (hazard zone A) 3123 6.1 0.8 2.2 7.0 7.0
Poisonous liquid, water-reactive, nos (hazard zone B) 3123 6.1 0.3 1.1 2.1 4.5
Poisonous liquid, flammable gases in water (hazard zone A) 3123 6.1 0.8 2.2 7.0 7.0
Poisonous liquid, flammable gases in water (hazard zone B) 3123 6.1 0.3 1.1 2.1 4.6
Toxic liquid, water-reactive, nos (hazard zone A) 3123 6.1 0.8 2.2 7.0 7.0
Toxic liquid, water-reactive, nos (hazard zone B) 3123 6.1 0.3 1.1 2.1 4.6
Toxic liquid, flammable gases in water (hazard zone A) 3123 6.1 0.8 2.2 7.0 7.0
Toxic liquid, flammable gases in water (hazard zone B) 3123 6.1 0.3 1.1 2.1 4.6
Liquified gas, poisonous, flammable, nos (hazard zone A) 3160 2.3 0.8 3.2 5.4 7.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, flammable, nos (hazard zone B) 3160 2.3 0.2 0.8 2.5 6.7
Liquified gas, poisonous, flammable, nos (hazard zone C) 3160 2.3 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, flammable, nos (hazard zone D) 3160 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
Liquified gas, toxic, flammable, nos (hazard zone A) 3160 2.3 0.8 3.2 5.4 7.0
Liquified gas, toxic, flammable, nos (hazard zone B) 3160 2.3 0.2 0.8 2.5 6.7
Liquified gas, toxic, flammable, nos (hazard zone C) 3160 2.3 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.0
Liquified gas, toxic, flammable, nos (hazard zone D) 3160 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
Liquified gas, poisonous, nos (hazard zone A) 3162 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, nos (hazard zone B) 3162 2.3 0.3 1.3 4.9 7.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, nos (hazard zone C) 3162 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, nos (hazard zone D) 3162 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.8 2.4
Liquified gas, toxic, nos (hazard zone A) 3162 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Liquified gas, toxic, nos (hazard zone B) 3162 2.3 0.3 1.3 4.9 7.0
Liquified gas, toxic, nos (hazard zone C) 3162 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Liquified gas, toxic, nos (hazard zone D) 3162 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.8 2.4
Methanesulfonyl chloride 3246 6.1 0.2 0.4 1.0 1.6
Nitriles, poisonous, flammable, nos 3275 6.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0
Nitriles, poisonous, liquid, nos 3276 6.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0
Organophosphorus compound, poisonous, liquid, nos 3278 6.1 0.3 0.8 1.9 3.7
Organophosphorus compound, poisonous, flammable, nos 3279 6.1 0.3 0.8 1.9 3.7
Organoarsenic compound, liquid, nos 3280 6.1 0.1 0.4 1.3 3.2
Metal carbonyls 3281 6.1 0.5 2.2 2.9 6.1
Poisonous liquid, inorganic, nos (hazard zone A) 3287 6.1 0.6 2.2 3.3 6.9
Poisonous liquid, inorganic, nos (hazard zone B) 3287 6.1 0.3 1.1 2.1 4.6
Toxic liquid, inorganic, nos (hazard zone A) 3287 6.1 0.6 2.2 3.3 6.9
Toxic liquid, inorganic, nos (hazard zone B) 3287 6.1 0.3 1.1 2.1 4.6
Poisonous liquid, corrosive, inorganic, nos (hazard zone A) 3289 6.1 0.6 2.2 3.3 6.9
Poisonous liquid, corrosive, inorganic, nos (hazard zone B) 3289 6.1 0.3 1.1 2.1 4.6
Toxic liquid, corrosive, inorganic, nos (hazard zone A) 3289 6.1 0.6 2.2 3.3 6.9
Toxic liquid, corrosive, inorganic, nos (hazard zone B) 3289 6.1 0.3 1.1 2.1 4.6
Hydrogen cyanide solution in alcohol 3294 6.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.3
Carbon dioxide and ethylene mixture 3300 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
Compressed gas, poisonous, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone A) 3303 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Compressed gas, poisonous, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone B) 3303 2.3 0.3 1.3 2.2 5.5
Compressed gas, poisonous, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone C) 3303 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Name of Hazardous Material
Emergency 
Response 
ID Number
Classification 
(49CFR172.101)
US DOT ERG Protective Action Distance
Small Spills Large Spills
 
 
 
 
 
105 
 
    
Day    (mi)
Night     
(mi) Day    (mi)
Night     
(mi)
Compressed gas, poisonous, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone D) 3303 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.8 2.4
Compressed gas, poisonous, toxic, nos (hazard zone A) 3303 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Compressed gas, poisonous, toxic, nos (hazard zone B) 3303 2.3 0.3 1.3 2.2 5.5
Compressed gas, poisonous, toxic, nos (hazard zone C) 3303 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Compressed gas, poisonous, toxic, nos (hazard zone D) 3303 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.8 2.4
Compressed gas, poisonous, corrosive, nos (hazard zone A) 3304 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Compressed gas, poisonous, corrosive, nos (hazard zone B) 3304 2.3 0.3 1.3 4.5 7.0
Compressed gas, poisonous, corrosive, nos (hazard zone C) 3304 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Compressed gas, poisonous, corrosive, nos (hazard zone D) 3304 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.4
Compressed gas, toxic, corrosive, nos (hazard zone A) 3304 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Compressed gas, toxic, corrosive, nos (hazard zone B) 3304 2.3 0.3 1.3 4.5 7.0
Compressed gas, toxic, corrosive, nos (hazard zone C) 3304 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Compressed gas, toxic, corrosive, nos (hazard zone D) 3304 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.4
Compressed gas, poisonous, flammable, corrosive, nos (hazard zone A) 3305 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Compressed gas, poisonous, flammable, corrosive, nos (hazard zone B) 3305 2.3 0.1 0.6 2.5 6.7
Compressed gas, poisonous, flammable, corrosive, nos (hazard zone C) 3305 2.3 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.0
Compressed gas, poisonous, flammable, corrosive, nos (hazard zone D) 3305 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
Compressed gas, toxic, flammable, corrosive, nos (hazard zone A) 3305 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Compressed gas, toxic, flammable, corrosive, nos (hazard zone B) 3305 2.3 0.1 0.6 2.5 6.7
Compressed gas, toxic, flammable, corrosive, nos (hazard zone C) 3305 2.3 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.0
Compressed gas, toxic, flammable, corrosive, nos (hazard zone D) 3305 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
Compressed gas, poisonous, oxidizing, corrosive, nos (hazard zone A) 3306 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Compressed gas, poisonous, oxidizing, corrosive, nos (hazard zone B) 3306 2.3 0.3 1.3 2.2 5.5
Compressed gas, poisonous, oxidizing, corrosive, nos (hazard zone C) 3306 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Compressed gas, poisonous, oxidizing, corrosive, nos (hazard zone D) 3306 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.4
Compressed gas, toxic, oxidizing, corrosive, nos (hazard zone A) 3306 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Compressed gas, toxic, oxidizing, corrosive, nos (hazard zone B) 3306 2.3 0.3 1.3 2.2 5.5
Compressed gas, toxic, oxidizing, corrosive, nos (hazard zone C) 3306 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Compressed gas, toxic, oxidizing, corrosive, nos (hazard zone D) 3306 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.4
Liquified gas, poisonous, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone A) 3307 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone B) 3307 2.3 0.3 1.3 2.2 5.5
Liquified gas, poisonous, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone C) 3307 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone D) 3307 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.8 2.4
Liquified gas, toxic, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone A) 3307 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Liquified gas, toxic, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone B) 3307 2.3 0.3 1.3 2.2 5.5
Liquified gas, toxic, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone C) 3307 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Liquified gas, toxic, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone D) 3307 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.8 2.4
Liquified gas, poisonous, corrosive, nos (hazard zone A) 3308 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, corrosive, nos (hazard zone B) 3308 2.3 0.3 1.3 4.5 7.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, corrosive, nos (hazard zone C) 3308 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, corrosive, nos (hazard zone D) 3308 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.4
Liquified gas, toxic, corrosive, nos (hazard zone A) 3308 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Liquified gas, toxic, corrosive, nos (hazard zone B) 3308 2.3 0.3 1.3 4.5 7.0
Liquified gas, toxic, corrosive, nos (hazard zone C) 3308 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Liquified gas, toxic, corrosive, nos (hazard zone D) 3308 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.4
Liquified gas, poisonous, flammable, corrosive, nos (hazard zone A) 3309 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, flammable, corrosive, nos (hazard zone B) 3309 2.3 0.1 0.6 2.5 6.7
Liquified gas, poisonous, flammable, corrosive, nos (hazard zone C) 3309 2.3 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, flammable, corrosive, nos (hazard zone D) 3309 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
Liquified gas, toxic, flammable, corrosive, nos (hazard zone A) 3309 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Liquified gas, toxic, flammable, corrosive, nos (hazard zone B) 3309 2.3 0.1 0.6 2.5 6.7
Liquified gas, toxic, flammable, corrosive, nos (hazard zone C) 3309 2.3 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.0
Liquified gas, toxic, flammable, corrosive, nos (hazard zone D) 3309 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
Liquified gas, poisonous, oxidizing, corrosive, nos (hazard zone A) 3310 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, oxidizing, corrosive, nos (hazard zone B) 3310 2.3 0.3 1.3 2.2 5.5
Liquified gas, poisonous, oxidizing, corrosive, nos (hazard zone C) 3310 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Liquified gas, poisonous, oxidizing, corrosive, nos (hazard zone D) 3310 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.4
Liquified gas, toxic, oxidizing, corrosive, nos (hazard zone A) 3310 2.3 3.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Liquified gas, toxic, oxidizing, corrosive, nos (hazard zone B) 3310 2.3 0.3 1.3 2.2 3.5
Liquified gas, toxic, oxidizing, corrosive, nos (hazard zone C) 3310 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.5 4.0
Liquified gas, toxic, oxidizing, corrosive, nos (hazard zone D) 3310 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.4
Ammonia solution woth 50+% ammonia 3318 2.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.4
Insecticide gas, poisonous, flammable, nos (hazard zone A) 3355 2.3 0.8 3.2 5.4 7.0
Insecticide gas, poisonous, flammable, nos (hazard zone B) 3355 2.3 0.2 0.8 2.5 6.7
Insecticide gas, poisonous, flammable, nos (hazard zone C) 3355 2.3 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.0
Name of Hazardous Material
Emergency 
Response 
ID Number
Classification 
(49CFR172.101)
US DOT ERG Protective Action Distance
Small Spills Large Spills
 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
    
Day      
(mi)
Night     
(mi)
Day      
(mi)
Night     
(mi)
Insecticide gas, poisonous, flammable, nos (hazard zone D) 3355 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
Insecticide gas, toxic, flammable, nos (hazard zone A) 3355 2.3 0.8 3.2 5.4 7.0
Insecticide gas, toxic, flammable, nos (hazard zone B) 3355 2.3 0.2 0.8 2.5 6.7
Insecticide gas, toxic, flammable, nos (hazard zone C) 3355 2.3 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.0
Insecticide gas, toxic, flammable, nos (hazard zone D) 3355 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
Poisonous by inhalation liquid, nos (hazard zone A) 3381 6.1 0.8 2.2 7.0 7.0
Poisonous by inhalation liquid, nos (hazard zone B) 3382 6.1 0.3 1.1 2.1 4.6
Poisonous by inhalation liquid, flammable, nos (hazard zone A) 3383 6.1 0.8 2.2 7.0 7.0
Poisonous by inhalation liquid, flammable, nos (hazard zone B) 3384 6.1 0.2 0.6 1.6 3.5
Poisonous by inhalation liquid, water-reactive, nos (hazard zone A) 3385 6.1 0.8 2.2 7.0 7.0
Poisonous by inhalation liquid, water-reactive, nos (hazard zone B) 3386 6.1 0.3 1.1 2.1 4.6
Poisonous by inhalation liquid, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone A) 3387 6.1 0.8 2.2 7.0 7.0
Poisonous by inhalation liquid, oxidizing, nos (hazard zone B) 3388 6.1 0.2 0.9 1.7 4.3
Poisonous by inhalation liquid, corrosive, nos (hazard zone A) 3389 6.1 0.5 1.5 3.9 7.0
Poisonous by inhalation liquid, corrosive, nos (hazard zone B) 3390 6.1 0.3 1.1 2.1 4.6
Aluminum alkyl halides, solid (water) 3461 4.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8
Chlorine dioxide, hydrate, frozen (water) 9191 5.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4
Fluorine, refrigerated liquid 9192 2.3 0.1 0.3 0.5 2.2
Carbon monoxide, refrigerated liquid 9292 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.5
Methyl phosphonic dichloride 9206 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Chloropivaloyl chloride 9263 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
3,5-Dichloro-2,4,6-trifluoropyridine 9264 6.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Trimethyloxysilane 9269 6.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.4
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Name:   Craig Emmitt Roco 
 
Address:  HNTB Corporation 
   301 Congress Avenue 
   Suite 600 
   Austin, Texas 78701 
 
Email Address: croco@HNTB.com 
 
Education:  B.S., Stephen F. Austin State University, 1987 
   B.S., Civil Engineering, Texas A&M University, 1995 
   M.S., Petroleum Engineering, Texas A&M University, 2000 
   M.S., Finance, Texas A&M University, 2007 
 
 
    
   
 
 
 
